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Abstract
Lack of accessible clean water impacts millions of people around the world. Throughout
the 1990s, the privatization of developing countries’ water sectors was seen as a way to improve
inefficient and ineffective water service. While many of the privatization projects failed, it is
important to assess the possibility of learning from these mistakes, and better utilizing private
sector support as a tool to address global water deficiencies. I set out to show that water
privatization can be an effective tool to address urban water needs if the process is conducted
correctly. Through the completion of three case studies, I am able to learn from the successes and
failures of past projects. The knowledge learned from these studies shows that the way in which
a privatization is undertaken greatly affects the outcome of the project. The paper concludes that
while privatization could greatly improve the lives of citizens living in urban areas who suffer
from water deficiencies, privatization will not greatly influence the water crisis due to the
inability to implement the process in rural areas.

4

Introduction
This thesis will attempt to assess the viability of water privatization as a policy tool to
address water issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. Privatization was pushed by the World Bank
throughout the 1990s, but often failed to bring about the expected improvements. This thesis
seeks to see if water privatization is a poor model, or a model that if altered, could help to
address global water deficiencies.
This paper will look at the history of the privatization of water resources in order to learn
from past projects. Chapter One lays out the current water problems faced by millions around the
world. It focuses on urban issues as well as issues specific to the region of Sub-Saharan Africa.
This discussion of the current situation illustrates the need for major policy and investment in
order to address global water deficiencies. Chapter Two looks at the history of privatization with
special focus on the privatization of water. Chapter Three examines the major players within the
privatization process. Chapter Four looks at three case studies of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
that privatized their water services. The countries are Guinea, Senegal, and Ghana. Chapter Five
presents the findings from the case studies, and makes suggestions for conditions that if met
would make future privatizations more successful. The information learned from the case studies
will show that while privatization will not be a solution for the global water crisis, if
implemented effectively, it could serve as a policy tool to help address urban water deficiencies.

5

Chapter One: The Global Water Crisis
Labeling the current global water situation as anything other than a crisis would be to
downplay the severity of the problem. Globally, 780 million people lack access to clean water.
This deficiency, and the subsequent diseases caused by the use of unsafe water, results in
roughly 3.41 million deaths per year.1 These numbers can be hard to fathom in a world that
seems to be covered in water. Of all of the water on the planet, only 2.5 percent is freshwater. Of
this, roughly 70 percent is locked in ice caps, 30 percent is stored underground, and only 0.3
percent of water is easily accessibly in rivers and lakes.2 While working to conserve our
freshwater resources is an important aspect to consider, currently the focus should be on the
unequal distribution and allocation of this fresh water. People without readily available access to
fresh water, and without the infrastructure to access water underground, must often walk miles in
order to secure enough water for all their needs. In urban areas, people rarely have to walk far
distances to collect their water, but often are forced to pay high prices to access the resource.
The region of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) provides the greatest insight into these water
issues. While most regions throughout the world have seen great improvement in water
coverage, SSA currently stands at only 61 percent of the region having access to an improved
drinking water source.3 An improved drinking source is defined by the WHO/UNICEF Joint
Monitoring Program (JMP) as, “one that, by nature of its construction or through active
intervention, is protected from outside contamination, in particular from contamination with

1

"Water Facts." Water.org. N.p., 2013. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://water.org/water-crisis/water-facts/water/>.
"Water Resources." UN Water. The United Nations, n.d. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://www.unwater.org/statistics_res.html>.
3
Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012 Update. Rep. UNICEF/WHO, 2012. 4. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://www.unicef.org/media/files/JMPreport2012.pdf>.
2

6

faecal matter.”4 Additionally, of all the inhabitants of SSA, only 16 percent have access to piped
water on their premises, the lowest percentage of any region in the world.5
Due to the economic cost of supplying a large number of people with the service, the
privatization of water resources can only occur in urban areas. In rural areas, people are too
widely dispersed to make water extension economically attractive to private companies. Due to
this, this thesis will focus on urban water issues. The United Nations (UN) projects that as of
2011, 47 percent of the population in the developing world lived in urban areas. This number is
expected to increase to 64 percent of the total population by 2050.6 Improved water supply
coverage is high in urban areas at 96 percent with 80 percent of the population having access to
piped water connections. While these numbers are good, it is important to note that between
1990 and 2010 the global urban population saw the number of people using an unapproved water
source increase from 109 to 130 million people.7 This shows that as the global urban population
continues to grow, there must be continued investment in urban areas even if coverage seems to
be high. It is especially important to look at the poorest urban dwellers who are more likely to
lack access to water supply and rely on unimproved sources.
While it seems that the urban population has a high level of water coverage, when the
JMP looked at 35 countries in SSA (84 percent of the total regional population), and broke the
averages down into quintiles based on wealth, a different story emerged. It was found that in
urban areas, 94 percent of the richest quintile has access to an improved water source while the

4

"Introduction." WHO / UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation. JMP, 2010.
Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/introduction/>.
5
Ibid., p. 8
6
World Urbanization Prospects The 2011 Revision. Rep. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Mar. 2012. 2.
Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://esa.un.org/unup/pdf/WUP2011_Highlights.pdf>.
7
Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012 Update, p. 12
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poorest quintile has only 64 percent coverage.8 What this breakdown shows is that while the
global urban population does have a higher level of coverage compared to the global rural
population, when the numbers are broken down based on region and income the urban
population still has many issues that must still be addressed.
The lack of access to water across SSA results in many difficulties including issues with
health, education, gender equity, and economic development. It is only when all of these issues
are viewed holistically that the full burden faced by those without access can be completely
understood.

Health
One of the greatest burdens faced by those without clean water is the impact on their
health. Numerous diseases, including diarrhea, pneumonia, Guinea Worm, Cholera, and
Schistosomiasis are all caused by lack of clean water. Additionally, many health issues are
indirectly hurt by poor water. Malaria, caused by mosquitoes, is supported by the presence of
sitting water. Also, people with HIV/AIDS are more susceptible to water related diseases and
have a more difficult time recovering from such infections.9 Many of these diseases are more
common in rural areas, but urban areas also see pneumonia and diarrhea as major problems. This
is especially true in informal settlements where there is a high population density with limited
services.
The high prevalence of these diseases has an incredible influence on economics.
Globally, if the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of cutting in half the number of people

8

Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012 Update, p. 29
"Common Water and Sanitation-related Diseases." Unicef.org. UNICEF, 17 June 2003. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://www.unicef.org/wash/index_wes_related.html>.
9
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without access to basic water and sanitation was met, there would be a savings of seven billion
dollars in the health sector.10 If improvements occurred beyond the MDGs, and basic access to
water and sanitation was extended across SSA, US $610 million, or seven percent of the region's
total costs, would be cut from the regional health costs.11 These savings, coupled with increases
in productivity in the workforce and extended life expectancy, could dramatically alter the
economic landscape of the region.
Children living without access to clean water face the greatest health struggles, especially
those under the age of five years old. Globally, pneumonia (18 percent) is the leading cause of
death for children under five years old. Not far behind is diarrhea (11 percent), which is the third
leading cause of death.12 In a survey conducted in 2008, Africa had 4.199 million deaths of
children under the age of five. Of those, 19 percent were caused by diarrhea and 18 percent were
caused pneumonia.13 These problems are more significant in SSA, where a child under the age of
five is 16.5 percent more likely to die before their fifth birthday than their peers in developed
regions.14
With improved water for drinking, and an emphasis on hand washing, many of these
pneumonia and diarrheal cases could be prevented. The World Health Organization (WHO)
estimates that if the MDG of cutting in half those without access to clean water and basic

10

Sanctuary, M., H. Tropp, and A. Berntell. Making Water a Part of Economic Development. Rep. Stockholm
International Water Institute, n.d. 33. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/waterandmacroecon.pdf>.
11
Human Development Report 2006. Rep. United Nations Development Programme, 2006. 43 Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR06-complete.pdf>.
12
"Children: Reducing Mortality." who.int. World Health Organization, Sept. 2012. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs178/en/index.html>.
13
Black, Robert E., et al. Global, Regional, and National Causes of Child Mortality in 2008: A Systematic Analysis.
Rep. Child Health Epidemiology Reference Group of WHO and UNICEF, 12 May 2012. 7. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://wwwlive.who.int/immunization_monitoring/diseases/Lancet_2010_withAppendix.pdf>.
14
“Children: Reducing Mortality”
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sanitation was met, there would be a global reduction in diarrheal cases of about ten percent.15
Additionally, a study was done to assess the cost-benefit of different levels of intervention in the
water and sanitation sectors. The study found that if the MDG was met, and the number of
people without access to improved water and sanitation was cut in half, the value of deaths
avoided due to intervention would be US $3.56 billion/year in future earnings.16
Looking at the Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) statistic helps to quantify just how
much of an impact improvements in the water sector can have on health. The WHO defines:
One DALY [can be thought of] as one lost year of "healthy" life. The sum of these
DALYs across the population, or the burden of disease, can be thought of as a
measurement of the gap between current health status and an ideal health situation where
the entire population lives to an advanced age, free of disease and disability.17
Due to poor water, and the closely related issue of inadequate sanitation, being associated with
so many different diseases, the number of DALYs are high. The WHO estimates that diseases
caused by poor water and sanitation result in 60 million DALYs every year. This accounts for
four percent of the total global DALYs.18 Looking at the time saved from illness can help to
measure the costs and benefits of improving infrastructural. Due to the high cost associated with
water and sanitation infrastructure, it is important to assess the associated benefit of the project
prior to implementation. In a study conducted for the WHO, it was found that when viewed in
terms of the days saved from illness, both in terms of working and schooling, the cost benefit of
water and sanitation improvements was high across all regions and types of intervention. It was
15

"Costs and Benefits of Water and Sanitation Improvements at the Global Level (Evaluation of The)." WHO.
World Health Organization, 2004. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/wsh0404summary/en/index.html>.
16
Hutton, Guy, and Laurence Haller. Evaluation of the Costs and Benefits of Water and Sanitation Improvements at
the Global Level. Rep. World Health Organization, 2004. 33-34. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/wsh0404.pdf>.
17
"Metrics: Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY)." Who.int. World Health Organization, 2013. Web. 28 Apr.
2013. <http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/metrics_daly/en/>.
18
Human Development Report 2006, p. 45
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estimated that a US $1 investment would yield a return of between US $5 and US $11 depending
on region and type of intervention.19

Education
While young children face great health risks due to lack of clean water, when they do
make it past their fifth birthday, health issues caused by lack of accessible and clean water results
in roughly 443 million school days lost every year.20 This is significant because it has been
shown that educated households benefit from faster reductions in poverty and increased growth
when compared to uneducated households.21 If the water crisis, felt almost exclusively in
developing countries, is hindering future household education levels, there will be a much more
difficult path to development.
When children are in school, many are suffering from health issues that directly affect
their ability to learn. UNICEF reports that there are millions of children around the world who
are either unable to attend school, or are present but unproductive, due to water related
diseases.22 This issue of missing school is significant because too many school days lost can
result in students dropping out. Intervention could make a significant difference as it has been
found that if the MDG was met, and half the people without access to improved water and
sanitation gained access, 272 million school days would be gained per year solely from the
decreased prevalence of diarrhea.23

19

Hutton and Haller, p. 39
Human Development Report 2006, p. 6
21
Appleton, Simon. Education, Incomes and Poverty in Uganda in the 1990s. Publication. Centre for Research in
Economic Development and International Trade, University of Nottingham, Dec. 2001. 4. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/credit/documents/papers/01-22.pdf>.
22
Sanctuary, Tropp and Berntell, p. 14
23
Hutton and Haller, p. 29
20
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Girls are at a high risk for dropping out of school due to lack of water supply and
sanitation facilities. When girls reach puberty, they often are forced to miss school due to their
educational settings not having the necessary sanitation facilities. Without access to a separate
and private space, girls stay home. This eventually adds up to a large number of school days
missed and it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to catch up on missed material. 24 This only
adds to the educational achievement gap often found between boys and girls.
All of the issues discussed show the strong connection between water deficiencies and
education. Around the world, children are being kept from school due to insufficient water and
sanitation services. If this were addressed, the issues of an uneducated future workforce and
gender inequality would both be addressed. While it was discussed that girls are
disproportionately impacted by lack of accessible water and sanitation facilities in the education
setting, they also face other issues in the sector due to their gender.

Gender Equity
When a community lacks an accessible water source, the burden falls especially hard on
women. The most common issue is the need to walk to collect their family’s daily water needs.
A survey of 25 SSA countries found that in 71 percent of families without an accessible water
source, women and girls were the primary family members responsible for water collection.25
This need to collect water is more prevalent in rural areas, where water sources are far apart. In
urban areas, women have fewer challenges finding an accessible water point, but their gender
still impacts their experience in the sector.

24

"Gender and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene(WASH)." Unicef.org. UNICEF, n.d. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://www.unicef.org/esaro/7310_Gender_and_WASH.html>.
25
Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012 Update, p. 31
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While women face challenges, their increased participation in the water and sanitation
sectors would be beneficial to future projects. A study done across 88 communities, in 15
countries, found that the projects that better took into account the voices of men and women,
across varied income levels, were more sustainable.26 This study came from the idea that men
and women, and the needs of the poor and rich, greatly differ. Women require more privacy than
men and the poor have economic constraints on what they can afford to pay for services. If all
voices are included in the conversation, from planning to implementation, the project will have a
better chance of being sustained.
While urban women face fewer challenges than their rural counterparts, their inclusion in
the water sector could greatly alter the success of projects. The needs of women must be better
focused on if the water and sanitation sectors, along with overall development, are to improve.

Economics
The statistics presented above show the need for improvements, as well as the daunting
task in expanding water and sanitation coverage. If the problem is viewed solely in terms of the
economic implications, it is clear that there are great opportunities for gains. The WHO estimates
that in order to provide all of Africa with access to improved water and sanitation it would cost
US $4.043 billion per year. While high, the economic benefit would be US $44.036 Billion per
year. This results in an annual cost/benefit ratio of 10.89.27 While needed investments are high,
the economic benefit felt through improvements is significantly higher. These benefits would be
seen within the growth of the economy. It has been found that, “poor countries with improved
26

Gross, Bruce, Christine Van Wijk, and Nilanjana Mukherjee. Linking Sustainability with Demand, Gender and
Poverty. Rep. Water and Sanitation Program, Dec. 2000. 19. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://www.wsp.org/sites/wsp.org/files/publications/global_plareport.pdf>.
27
Sanctuary, Tropp and Berntell, p. 34
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access to clean water and sanitation services enjoyed annual average growth of 3.7%...similarly
poor countries but without improved access had average annual per capita GDP growth of only
0.1%.”28 The correlation between water access and economic development is clear.

Conclusion
The current global water crisis impacts the health, education, gender equity, and
economics of developing countries around the world. The issue is especially problematic in SSA
where lack of infrastructure and available investment prohibit any real improvements and instead
leave those without access suffering. As the global population continues to grow, and water
resources available remain constant, the time is now to make significant investments in the
sector. One potential solution is a return to the age of water privatization that characterized the
1990s. While the projects of the 1990s are now largely seen as failures, it is important to
question if the privatization of water resources can be altered and successful, or if it will only
continue to perpetuate inequality and poverty. The answer to this question could greatly alter
future development policy.

28

Sanctuary, Tropp and Berntell, p. 40
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Chapter Two: A History of Privatization
Privatization evokes strong opinions from both sides of the debate. To understand the
rapid growth of privatization projects, one must go back to the 1980s and understand the
economic climate of the world. By starting in the 1980s, and moving to present time, one can
better understand the motives for privatizing public service sectors (ex: water, electricity, gas
etc). Specifically, water privatization projects have had mixed results, but the public sentiment
has been largely negative. Looking at the growth of water privatization, and the arguments for
and against the process, will allow for a better understanding of how the process can better serve
all parties involved.

Economic Climate 1980-1990
A recession experienced throughout the 1970s led to the 1980s and an emphasis on
neoliberal policies. When President Ronald Reagan was elected to office in 1980, he sought to
revert from previous administration’s policies and adopt an economic policy focused on free
market ideology.29 The overbearing presence of government intervention in economic affairs was
seen as a major factor in the problems on the 1970s. It was at this moment that people began to
argue that if the government stepped back and allowed for markets to function without
intervention, there would be a period of growth and an increase in the overall standard of
living.30 This belief was coined Neoliberalism and one of the main pillars was privatization.

29

Kemp, Tom. The Climax of Capitalism: The US Economy in the Twentieth Century. London: Longman, 1990.
204. Print.
30
Kiely, Ray. Empire in the Age of Globalisation: US Hegemony and Neoliberal Disorder. London: Pluto, 2005. 95.
Print.
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In 1989, economist John Williamson coined the term “Washington Consensus” to
describe his list of ten principles that most of Washington could agree on as policy for
development in Latin America. Williamson believed that the original neoliberal policies,
championed by President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, were largely gone with one
exception: privatization.31 While initially the term was confined to the ten principles which were
meant to be applied to a specific region, over time the “Washington Consensus” was used as a
term to characterize all the neoliberal policies from the Reagan and Thatcher era. Additionally, it
was used to characterize the policies of the World Bank and IMF for all developing countries
rather than the one specific region.32 This highlights one of the defining issues of development
policy during this time period, which was that the path to economic development was
streamlined into a uniform process for all countries. Regardless of a country’s initial level of
development, or its specific needs, it was believed that these policies were the solution. As can
be expected, these policies were not the panacea for development ills, but in many cases left the
people of developing countries worse off than they were prior to reform.33
The policies that guided the Washington Consensus were fiscal austerity, privatization,
and market liberalization. Fiscal austerity involves gaining control of spending and implementing
more disciplined fiscal decision-making. Privatization, which will be discussed more in depth
below, is the process of turning a previously government run sector over to private operators in
an attempt to make the operations more efficient.34 Finally, liberalization is, “the removal of

31

Williamson, John. A Short History of the Washington Consensus. Working paper. Institute for International
Economics, 24 Sept. 2004. 2. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf>.
32
Williamson, John. "The Washington Consensus and Beyond." Economic and Political Weekly 38.15 (2003):
1476. Jstor. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/4413431>.
33
Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002. 16. Print.
34
Ibid., p. 53
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government interferences in financial markets, capital markets, and barriers to trade.”35 In his
book, Globalization and its Discontents, Joseph Stiglitz argues that these policies had an adverse
impact on developing countries because they were pushed too far and too fast.36 When looking at
the case studies in Chapter Four, and the findings in Chapter Five, I concur with his belief that
the pace and way which in which privatization is implemented impacts the outcome of a
privatization project.37
The reliance on these policies exposes another theme of development, which was the
frequency of policies being prescribed by the global North for the global South. This split is
defined as the separation between developed and developing nations, which also corresponds to
their geographic location. Development has followed a similar path where organizations of the
North such as the World Bank, IMF, and other development agencies have significant power
over the fragile developing countries of the South. Developing countries follow the lead of these
institutions because they need help and access to capital. The problem is these organizations are
led by elites who all too often are looking out for commercial and financial of the North rather
than the needs of the voiceless South.38

Privatization of Services
There are varying types of privatization, with differing levels of corporate control. There
are three types of contracts used for the privatization of a service sector: concession, lease, and
management. Under a concession contract, the private company is fully responsible for running
the sector and making all needed investments. A lease contract requires that the private operator

35

Ibid., p. 59
Ibid., p. 54
37
Ibid., p. 54
38
Ibid., p. 18-22
36
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run the day-to-day operations and make needed investments in existing infrastructure. The
government is responsible for all new investment costs. Finally, under a management contract,
the private operator manages the operations but is not responsible for any investment.39 As will
be seen in the three case studies, these definitions serve as guidelines, but individual projects
alter the conditions of the contract for their individual needs. For the purpose of this paper, the
term “privatization” will refer to any form of private participation as described above.
While each country may have unique reasons for privatization, the motives can usually be
traced back to a desire to improve services, a need to alleviate government costs, and/or due to
pressure from outside sources.
A country that is suffering from poor services may choose to privatize public sectors in
hopes of seeing improvements. There is a generally accepted belief that private companies have
access to capital, and means of investment, that allow them to infuse more money into the sector
than cash-strapped governments. A World Bank study of 79 privatized firms in 21 developing
countries found that profitability, efficiency, and output all increased when the firms moved from
public to private ownership.40 While the World Bank may have only chosen projects that it
believed would be successful, it still shows that privatization can have a positive impact on
inefficient or ineffective sectors.
Another reason a country may go through the process of privatizing its resources is that
the government has limited capital and privatization allows for the government to free up money
for other services and needs. When the private sector takes on some level of control and

39

Barlow, Maude. Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and the Coming Battle for the Right to Water. New
York: New, 2007. 39-40 Print.
40
Boubakri, Narjess, and Jean-Claude Cosset. Privatization in Developing Countries. Publication no. 156. The
World Bank, Nov. 1998. 1. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282884-1303327122200/156cosse.pdf>.
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responsibility for delivering services, it brings in capital that the government cannot afford. The
same World Bank study cited above found that the capital investment to sales ratio went up from
10.5 percent to 23.7 percent after privatization.41 This illustrates the notion that when privatized,
a sector has greater capital investment.
While improved services and increased capital investment are intended benefits of
privatization, many countries are forced to privatize their resources under pressure from the
World Bank. This pressure has come most notably under World Bank Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs). Under these programs, the World Bank agrees to alter existing loans that
developing countries cannot repay. In return for the adjustment to the loan, countries often must
sell its public services to private companies.42 The influence of both the World Bank will be
addressed more in Chapter Three when the major players of water privatization are discussed.

Privatization Process
When a government decides to privatize a previously public service, there are stages that
are generally followed in order to facilitate the process. First, the government develops a plan for
the privatization. It is during this stage that an outline consisting of the government and private
operator’s roles is formulated as well as defining the goals of privatization. The next step is to
construct the details of the process. During this stage, there is more formulation on the expected
outcomes and how costs will be recovered. The third step consists of picking the service
operator. This process is vital in terms of future success or failure of the project. The project
must be presented in a way that is attractive to the best providers in terms of their ability and fit
with the country’s needs. Finally, the fourth step is to manage the arrangement and actually

41
42

Boubakri and Cosset, p. 3
Barlow, p. 37-38
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begin the era of privatization.43 The better executed these four steps, the better chance of private
sector success.
In looking at step three of the process, the way in which an operator is selected is
important for both the validity of project and the chance of success. There are three generally
utilized methods for selecting an operator. The first option is competitive bidding in which
companies submit bids with an outline of their plan for the project and the cost to implement
their strategy. This process is seen as the most transparent, but has the highest risk for receiving
low bids in order to win the contract. Some processes use a competitive negotiations approach
where negotiations go back and forth between the government and the group submitting a bid.
The back and forth nature of this process results in decreased transparency, but the increased
input from the government helps in reducing the possibility of low bids. Finally, the third form of
choosing an operator is through direct negotiations. With direct negotiations, the process usually
stems from the private provider submitting a project proposal rather than the government seeking
project ideas. While costs are lowered due to the removal of the bidding component, this process
is seen as the most susceptible to corruption and lack of transparency.44
While this process was supported by the World Bank, SSA has had limited experience
with privatization. The total number of privatization sales went from 175 in 1990 to 2,200 in
1998. These sales, totaled US $9 billion, and only accounted for 3 percent of all developing
countries’ proceeds during the 1990s.45 While privatization schemes have continued to develop
in the region during the early years of the 21st century, SSA has much less experience with
privatization than other regions. Obviously the sector has even less experience when solely
43

PPIAF Staff. Approaches to Private Sector Participation. Herndon, VA: World Bank Publications, 2005. 18-21.
Print.
44
Ibid., p. 168-170
45
Kikeri, Sunita, and John Nellis. An Assessment of Privatization. Vol. 19 No.1. The World Bank, 2004. 92. Web.
28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.nioclibrary.ir/privatization/e008.pdf>.

20

looking at water privatization. This is significant in terms of its impact on future water
privatization projects. With SSA being the region most in need of water sector improvements,
there are fewer cases to learn from that take into account the unique conditions of the region.
This makes the small sample size of private water projects even more significant to learn from
for future projects.

The Privatization of Water
The modern push to privatize water began in 1989 when British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher sold control of the United Kingdom's water sector to private companies. The Thatcher
privatization opened the door for an increase in water privatization projects around the world.
Prior to the UK’s water privatization, $300 million was spent worldwide on water privatization
(1984-1990). This is minimal when compared to the $24 billion used to fund water privatization
projects between 1990 and 1997.46 After 1997, there was a clear decline in privatization projects
in large part caused by financial crises in Russia, Argentina, and across Asia that resulted in
decreased foreign direct investment.47 Water projects were not spared from the crisis. After the
height of investment of roughly US $10 billion in 1997, investments in water and sanitation
projects dropped and fell as low as US $2 billion in 2001 (see Chart One in the Appendix).48
After the financial crisis, and when economic activity and investment re-emerged, the water
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sector saw the least amount of funds for utilities due to the high capital-investment needed for
water projects.49
Privatization of the water sector has unique needs due to water supply being a natural
monopoly. A natural monopoly exists, “when a single firm can supply a good or service to an
entire market at a lower cost than could two or more firms”.50 Water services are a prime
example of a natural monopoly. Water service provision requires a large amount of infrastructure
at a high cost. It is much less expensive to have one firm with one set of pipes rather than two or
more firms building multiple sets of needed infrastructure.51 With only one provider for the
entire service, governments must implement a system of regulation in order to ensure fair
practices. It is important to note that while the case studies utilize a two firm approach (one
public and one private), they are working together with one set of infrastructure. People do not
have the choice between the two firms but rather must rely on the two to work together to
provide one service option. When the services are privatized it is essential that there is an
independent regulator to limit monopolistic power.52
It should be emphasized that water privatization only occurs in urban areas. While this
process has the potential to help urban citizens gain better access to water services, being a
policy option solely for urban areas is problematic for a few reasons. First, as discussed in
Chapter One, rural areas around the world are disproportionately impacted by lack of clean water
and adequate sanitation. Rural citizens lack the connections to water sources and thus must travel
great distances in order to access clean water. When privatization projects are undertaken, all
finances allocated for the project are then directed to urban areas that already have access to
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more services and more finances than their rural counterparts.53 Privatization has been hailed as
the solution to the water crisis but this is impossible if projects do not even target the geographic
areas most in need. Instead, privatization should be assessed based on the possibility of
contributing, but not solving, the global water crisis.
The growing water crisis, and high capital investment needed for water sector
improvements make privatization an appealing option. That being said, the need for water in
order to sustain life in a way other natural monopolies do not has made water privatization a
heated debate. Both those in favor and opposed to privatization make valid points that are
important to consider.

Arguments For and Against Privatization
There are numerous debates between those for, and those against, water privatization.
The first debate is over whether the private sector can better manage the delivery of a service or
if their desire for profit maximization hurts the sector. The second debate is over whether water
should be viewed as an economic or social good. The third argument is over how water should
be priced. Finally, there is debate about the impact of privatization on the labor force. Looking at
these four debates helps one to understand why this is such a heated topic.

Private Sector Participation: Efficiency or Profit
One of the strongest arguments for water privatization is that up to this point
governments have failed to provide the needed investment to extend and improve water
53

Budds, Jessica, and Gordon McGranahan. "Are the Debates on Water Privatization Missing the Point?
Experiences from Africa, Asia, and Latin America."Environment and Urbanization 15.2 (2003): Sage Publications.
International Institute for Environment and Development, 1 Oct. 2003. 88. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://eau.sagepub.com/content/15/2/87.full.pdf+html>.

23

resources. Government’s inability to finance and provide extended infrastructure has left a large
percentage of countries populations without the most basic water and sanitation services Those
in favor of privatization argue that when a private company enters the sector, they are able to
provide financing, contribute a higher level of knowledge of the sector, and provide the service
across a larger area at a higher quality than the public sector.54 While the commonly held belief
that privatize companies have access to increased knowledge, capital, and management
transcends sectors, the impact of this capital can only be understood when looking at individual
country case studies.
A major concern of those against privatization is that a private company's primary focus
is profit maximization. This leads companies to do what is in the best interest of their bottom line
even if it means that the water needs of all citizens are not met. Any private company is going to
enter the sector and ensure that prices are set to so that their profit margin satisfies the
stakeholders within the company. This means that the short-term profit maximization is valued
more than the long-term needs of the community and the sustainability of the resource.55
The water market is attractive to corporations due to the increasing scarcity of the good.
In 2003, the Palisades Global Water Index was created and is, “comprised of companies traded
on stock exchanges worldwide that are positioned to benefit significantly from the escalating
global demand for water and the ecological imperative of sustainable water resource
governance.”56 In order to be included within the index water companies must meet three
requirements:
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● A minimum total market capitalization of US$150 million.
● A traded volume greater than 100,000 shares for each of the prior three months.
● A minimum average daily traded value of US$500,000 for the prior three months.57

From inception through 2007, the growth of the index has averaged 18.7 percent every year.58
This is index illustrates the increased awareness of the growing investment opportunities
connected to the water sector. There must be a balance between the private operator providing its
knowledge and ensuring the company makes enough profit for the participation to be
worthwhile.

Economic Good or Human Right
Advocates for privatization argue that water is an economic good, and should be treated
as such. The first time water was deemed an economic good was during the 1992 International
Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) in Dublin, Ireland. What came out of this
meeting is commonly known as the Dublin Principles. The fourth principle states that, “Water
has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic
good.”59
This distinction as an economic good makes sense because there is a cost for ensuring
water is clean and delivering that water to a source for use. Opponents of privatization argue that
while water may include economic issues, there is a social component as well that private
companies may ignore. Without water, humans cannot survive. It is this life sustaining nature of
water that causes some to look at water as a human rights issue. This belief has been supported

57

Ibid., p. 3-4
Barlow, p. 88
59
"The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development." International Conference on Water and the
Environment, n.d. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/hwrp/documents/english/icwedece.html>.
58

25

by the UN. In 2010, the UN passed a resolution that put the emphasis on water as a right. In the
resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly it was stated that, “Safe and clean drinking
water and sanitation is a human right essential to the full enjoyment of life and all other human
rights.”60 While this is an important step, UN General Assembly decisions are only
recommendations, and while influential, cannot dictate the way in which a country abides by or
rejects the decisions.61
While recognizing the importance of water as a right, there can be no denying the
economic qualities of water. Finding the balance between the good as both an economic
commodity and a human right has an impact on how water is delivered and at what price.

Water Pricing
The debate over whether water is an economic or social good impacts the decision over
how water is priced. Many people focused on the economic aspects of water argue that water
should be delivered at a level of full cost recovery. In a full cost recovery system, there are three
costs that must be accounted for. First, there are the day-to-day needs to supply water often
defined as the operator costs. The next cost is covering depreciation. As a system ages, it loses its
value and is more likely need repair. Depreciation costs account for the potential for those
needed improvements. The third cost is “return on capital” which is where funds need to be
collected in order to pay interest on debt needed to build the project or a return of equity.62
Around the world, countries are supplying water at a price that is below full cost recovery. This
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means there is no capital for investment, and when infrastructure fails, there is no way to pay for
needed repairs.
Others argue that supplying water at full cost recovery would leave a large percentage of
the population without the ability to pay for a basic human need. One solution to concern over
pricing water at an unaffordable level has been to implement subsidies. There are three ways to
use subsidies in the water market. First, there is the implementation of a cross-subsidy where the
revenue from some customers helps to cover the cost of other customers. Next is the
implementation of a tax collected from the government. Finally, the allocation of grants from
international development groups can help cut costs.63 While in many places subsidies are
keeping the cost of water affordable, it should be noted that in the developing world US $45
billion is spent annually in order to subsidize water.64 There must be a way to make the delivery
of water supply more efficient and less expensive while ensuring governments do not need to
utilize a large amount of their resources for subsidies. The cross subsidy and use of funds from
development organizations will be assessed in two of the three case studies discussed in Chapter
Four.
As with many debates, there are valid points on both sides of the argument. Water should
be viewed as an economic good due to the cost of collecting and delivering the service. At the
same time, it should not be ignored that water is a vital human need. As will be seen in the case
studies, a balance must be struck between providing the good at a price that ensures the sector is
financially stable and creating social programs so the poorest citizens still have access.
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Impact on Employment
Another issue of contention is the notion that privatization increases unemployment. This
is due to the fact that government run sectors often have higher employment levels than is
efficient. Due to the desire to increase overall welfare in society, extra workers are hired to the
point where their marginal cost is greater than their marginal revenue.65 This leads to a high level
of inefficiency where sectors have more employees per customer than is needed. A World Bank
economist argued that this is especially true for, “enterprises that have operated as monopolies
with heavy government subsidies and other forms of protection.”66 This description is especially
characteristic of the water sector.
Additionally, these excess workers are often paid higher wages with greater benefits than
under private sector control. The profit maximization condition of private companies ensures that
private operators do not pay workers more than necessary in order to keep costs down and profits
up. In many cases where wages have decreased, benefits have increased in order to make up for
the wage decline.67 These exorbitant benefits are diminished when the private sector takes over
control.
While it is without argument that public enterprises often support extra laborers, at higher
wages than under private sector control, the overall impact on unemployment is subject to
debate. On one side, a survey of 308 privatization projects (across sectors) found that after
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privatization 78.4 percent of firms reduced employment.68 While significant, others have been
quick to argue that while initially unemployment may rise, increased investment and
improvement of the sector due to private control leads to increased employment in the long run.69
Without much knowledge on length of unemployment or level of subsequent employment
secured there will be continued debate on to what extent the transition to private operation
impacts employment.

Conclusion
Privatization is a contentious issue that will continue to be debated. The life sustaining
nature of water makes the issue of the privatization of water resources an even bigger debate than
when looking at the privatization of other service sector. While governments should be providing
this human need to all its citizens, the economic cost of the infrastructure needed to supply
everyone with piped water is too high for countries with weak economies. This lack of capital is
the case across much of SSA. Many factors intersect with this lack of capital and will be
discussed when looking at the case studies in Chapter Four. First, Chapter Three will look at the
major players in the process of privatization. Understanding the different motives and
experiences of the most influential players in the privatization process will help to see where
concessions can be made to make the most viable and create an environment with the greatest
chance of success for water sector improvements.
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Chapter Three: The Players in the Privatization Process
By looking at each group of actors in the privatization process, we can begin to
understand the motives and needs that guide their decision-making. As expected, the groups with
more financial power possess more influence over the structure and how the process is carried
out. The groups that have the greatest need for support must give up more in order having their
needs met. Finally, the people who have the most at stake, the citizens of the country, are often
completely left out of the decision making process.

The World Bank
The World Bank was created in 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire as part of the
Bretton Woods Conference. At the time of conception, the Bank's main focus was rebuilding
Europe after World War II. When the Marshall Plan was introduced, the World Bank changed
directions and began its goal of assisting developing countries.70 It should be noted that the
structure of the World Bank puts voting power in the hands of the countries that contribute the
most financially. These First World countries have control over who gets loans and under what
conditions those loans are granted.71 This is important because the poor must seek assistance
from the rich who have their own motives to satisfy.
While many development organizations and banks have financially supported the
emphasis on privatization, the World Bank's role in encouraging this process is significant. In the
1980s the World Bank switched strategies to satisfy the conditions of the Washington Consensus
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discussed in Chapter Two. With this move, the World Bank began the era of Structural
Adjustment Programs.72
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were designed to help solve the debt problem of
the Third World. These SAPs were implemented to encourage the policies of the Washington
Consensus.73 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) is the branch
of the World Bank that has the power to provide countries loans with privatization stipulations.74
Over time, many Third World countries had borrowed money from the World Bank at low
interest rates and were unable to pay-off their debt when interest rates rose. The World Bank's
solution was to forgive these debts as long as the indebted country agreed to privatize its public
institutions and services.75 The countries are put into an impossible situation where they need
their loans forgiven and have no real choice other than to give up their public resources.
The other branch of the World Bank involved in privatization is International Finance
Corporation (IFC). The IFC provides investments and advice to the private sector in order to help
it address global development issues.76 Depending on the contract type, the private company
often must commit itself to investing money in the water privatization project. Often, only a
small fraction of the total amount comes from the water provider and the rest comes from the
IFC and other financial groups.77
The First World countries that control the World Bank have a lot to gain from water
companies gaining access to developing countries water resources. Most notably, when a
developing country needs to privatize its water supply, it is almost always a company from the
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developed world that receives the job. By forcing countries to choose between privatizing their
water or get rejected for loans, they set up already well off countries to profit from developing
country’s needs.78 While the World Bank's work is to alleviate poverty across the world, many of
the policies they maintain do more to hurt the poor and help the rich. A report found that 99
percent of the loans made throughout the 1990s called for full-cost recovery.79 As discussed in
Chapter Two, full-cost recovery, without supporting measures, results in the price of water being
too high a cost for the poor to afford. While water prices need to increase, they must do so in a
way that takes into account the needs of the poor.
The ultimatum set up by the World Bank for poor countries of either privatizing their
services or not receiving loans makes it appear as if the elite know better than the country’s own
government. This leads to the discussion on why national governments privatize their water
resources and what they have to gain and lose in the process of giving up their right and
responsibility to provide their citizens with water. The government’s motive for privatization
will be discussed later in this chapter.

Water Privatization Companies (Veolia and Suez)
While the World Bank may support and promote water privatization projects, the group
with the most influence on the structure and outcome of the project is the private water company
that wins the bid to take over a country's water supply. For the purpose of understanding their
role, we will look at the two largest private water companies, Veolia (previously called Vivendi)
and Suez.
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In 1853, Compagnie Générale des Eaux (known as Vivendi) was created by Count Henri
Siméon and gained its first service contract with the city of Lyons, France. This was just one of
many private companies that were created during the time of Napoleon III when they were seen
as more efficient and providing a better quality service than the government.80 This was
especially important in 19th and 20th century, as more was understood about the importance of
hygiene and health. A study of particular interest found that there was an increase in life
expectancy of French women across three large cities from 1816 to 1905, which was largely
credited to improved water and sanitation sources. This hygienic revolution continued to the
point where in 1902, Paris was named the cleanest city in the world.81
While initially Vivendi only operated within France, in 1884 the company expanded
beyond their borders and received their first international subsidy in Venice, Italy. This was the
start of moving across Europe including other parts of Italy, Switzerland, Portugal and the
Ottoman Empire.82 As time went on, and with improvements in water treatment, testing, and
delivery, Vivendi was able to not only provide better services to the cities they were already
working in but was able to expand its work. Jumping ahead to 1998, Vivendi set up
“Waterforce” which is a team responsible for assisting countries and their water services after
natural disasters. During the late 1990s into the 2000s Vivendi continued to expand its influence
beyond France into other water markets.83
In the early 2000s, Vivendi self-destructed due to issues of corruption and bribery, which
resulted in lawsuits, a plummeting stock value, and the firing of many of the corporate leaders.
Most notable behind these corruption claims was the issue of money handling. Over time, the
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corporation set aside 27 billion Francs from user fees to save for maintenance needs. This money
was instead used to fund poor investments and took away from funds to refurbish old
infrastructure.84
At the end of 2002, Vivendi Environment changed its name to Veolia Environment in
order to separate itself from its negative past. During this time, Veolia chose to focus on
contracts that required little investment on the company’s part but resulted in a consistent cash
flow.85 Although the Vivendi went through a rough time, the current state is much stronger.
Today, the renamed company Veolia is the leading provider of water and sanitation services with
€12.6 billion in revenue and 103 million drinking water customers.86 It is important to note that
the company is currently only working in four sub-Saharan African countries (Gabon, Namibia,
Niger, and South Africa) and has found minimal success across the continent. As the global
water situation gets worse, Veolia has positioned itself to be a force to control another attempt at
water privatization as a means for development.

The history of Suez Environment goes back to 1858 when Ferdinand de Lessep formed
the company “Compagnie universelle du canal de Suez” in order to build, and later run, the Suez
Canal. In 1880 Société Lyonnaise des Eaux (Lyonnaise des Eaux) was setup to provide electric
and water services to the people of France and abroad. The company continued providing water
and sanitation services to France in addition to expanding to new global markets. In 1997, the
two companies merged to create the joint “Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux”. Not long after in 2002,
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Suez Environment was created as a way to group the water management, waste management,
energy services.87
While the prevalence of water privatization has diminished since the late 1990s, Suez has
positioned itself to be one of the main service providers as the debate over the best way to
provide water to the millions that go without. While Suez is also involved in communication,
waste management, and energy services, water has been the fastest growing.88 In 2011, Suez
Environment made €14.8 billion (71 percent in Europe and six percent in Africa and the Middle
East).89 Having only six percent of their revenue coming from Africa and the Middle East (and
no projects in SSA) shows there is room for growth as the water crisis continues. At the same
time, the untapped opportunity shows that there are major difficulties in providing water services
to the region. Water is a precious resource that is unrivaled in satisfying human’s needs. Suez has
positioned itself to ensure that if the globe reaches the tipping point where there is no choice but
to return to the utilization of private resources they are one of the premiere service providers.
The role of the private water company is significant in the privatization process. During
the planning stage, many governments are required to provide “financial guarantees” to the
private company. These are put into place to reduce the risk of the company investing in an
unstable project. Such guarantees include profit guarantees that ensure the company makes a
profit no matter the outcome of service. Going further, most concessions are 20 to 30 years in
length and are difficult and costly to cancel.90 From the view of the company these conditions
make sense. Entering a foreign market with great needs is risky and initial investment costly. By
putting these stipulations in place the company is better able to enter the partnership feeling like
87
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they are safe while still having something to gain. From the standpoint of the national
government and the citizens this just reaffirms the notion that the company is out to make a
profit.

National Governments
In the 19th century, water and sanitation services were originally supplied by private
companies to the wealthy who had the means to afford such luxury. As the benefits of sanitary
living conditions became more well-known, governments assumed the role of water and
sanitation provision.91 While the government takeover of the service was successful in many
developed countries, places without the capital and institutional resources to provide such a large
service failed to reach their entire population. It was during the 1970s that the division between
“statist”, those who believe it is that governments are best suited to address the needs of society,
and “neoliberals”, those who think that society’s needs should be addressed by private
organizations that are better able to provide needed services, became more pronounced and at
odds.92 As discussed previously, the developed world’s push for neoliberal ideology had a great
impact on the practices of the global South.
While it was discussed in Chapter Two, one of the main motives of government seeking
private sector support is its own inability to efficiently and effectively provide the service.
Beyond this, there are numerous reasons why the government looks to privatize its water
services.
One reason the government may want to privatize some services is to free up money for
other sectors. By privatizing a resource, the country no longer has to spend public money to meet
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the needs of sustaining the service. Instead, after privatization they can move the money to other
neglected areas of society. In many developing countries, the available public funds are limited
and cannot meet all of society's needs.
In addition to not being able to fully provide the service, another motive of the
government to move forward with water privatization is the need for financial help from the
World Bank. As discussed in the World Bank section, when governments find themselves in debt
or in need of other financial help they often turn to the World Bank. While the government has to
give up a large amount of control to a sector that they previously had a hundred percent control
of, they have its debt written off and/or receive the loan they need.
The transition to privatization has the opportunity to provide a lot to national
governments but at a steep cost. On one hand, the government is able to secure a needed service
for the people. Even in the cases where privatization has ultimately been unsuccessful, the
country is left with improved infrastructure. While service may be extended, governments often
end up with angry citizens who feel they have been hurt by the provision of water services from
a private supplier. This can impact politics and hurt leaders who are trying to balance the needs
of the country and the people.

Citizens
The most neglected group in the privatization process is also the most impacted by the
transfer. Big organizations and the national governments have a say in the matter while the
people who need the water, and struggle without it, rarely get a seat at the table. The citizens of
the developing world suffer greatly from lack of sufficient and safe water. If privatization were
the magic fix development organizations have been touting, citizens should be the group
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advocating for its implementation the most. Instead, they have been vocal and vehemently
against water privatization. Around the world people have spoken out, protested, and rioted
against private companies entering their communities and taking over a vital resource.93
The most famous of these riots was in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 1999-2000. In 1999, two
mandates set the stage for one of the greatest fights for water. First, the World Bank and the
International Development Bank made privatization a stipulation for a loan to the community.
Next, the government enacted Law 2029, which eliminated the guarantee of water to rural areas
although it had been a custom for all of time.94 While for many this was seen as a major problem,
it wasn't until the privatization began to be carried out that the people realized how disastrous
this agreement was. The 40-year contract with Aguas del Tunari guaranteed a yearly 16 percent
return on investment regardless of the quality of service provided. This guarantee resulted in
water bills increasing by as much as 300 percent and resulted in people unable to pay their
bills.95
In response to the private takeover of their water, the people banded together. The core
leadership group was known as the Coordinadora and was made up of people who had stake in
water supply and felt underrepresented.96 In early November of 1999, the Coordinadora began a
demonstration that ended up including over ten-thousand people. These series of demonstrations
continued through April of 2000 and mobilized over a hundred-thousand people. After many
months of difficulty, the protests ended when the Coordinadora came to an agreement with the
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government to terminate the contract with Aguas del Tunari and a service takeover by the
municipal government with input from the Coordinadora.97
What this demonstration illustrates is the passion of the issue among the people. They
were not happy with the water concession and new law and refused to go unheard. Their
unrelenting pressure forced the government to change the laws and do what benefited the people.
A less active, but very vocal, demonstration against privatization will be reviewed in the case
study on Ghana. When people who already struggle to get by are forced to adapt to excessive
price increases, their voices will be heard and the government will not be able to ignore them.

Conclusion
The World Bank, private water company, national government, and the citizens all have
different motives and needs when it comes water services and privatization. As would be
expected, the groups with the greatest influence are the ones with the most monetary power
(World Bank and Private Operator) whereas the groups with the greatest need are left to rely on
the powerful (national government and citizens). While some groups may have more power, we
will see in Chapter Four that the most successful privatization projects are the ones where all
participating parties needs are considered and addressed.
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Chapter Four: SSA Country Case Studies
In order to assess the viability of water privatization as a solution to the global water
crisis, I have conducted three case studies of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The three
countries selected were Guinea, Senegal, and Ghana. There were a few reasons as to why these
countries were chosen to evaluate.
First, one of the significant reasons these countries were chosen was because of the
timeframe in which the water privatizations occurred. The privatization of water was emphasized
by the World Bank throughout the 1990s. Guinea privatized its water resources from 1989 to
2001. Senegal privatized its water sector in 1996 and is still benefitting from private sector
participation. Finally, Ghana privatized its water sector from 2005 to 2011. While Ghana’s
timeframe is outside of the original goal of looking at countries that privatized their water in the
1990s, it became important to compare past projects to one that was implemented closer to the
present day.
Another reason for choosing these three countries was that they each had a unique
characteristic that is important to highlight. In Guinea, the project was the first water
privatization to receive support from the World Bank. This was significant because it served as
the model for many future projects. In Senegal, the project was the only one studied that was
very successful. This allowed for comparisons to be made to the less successful projects in
Guinea and Ghana. Additionally, the innovative financial model and the strong working
relationship between the government and the private operator were important aspects that could
greatly influence future projects. Finally, the fact that Ghana privatized its water resources more
recently served as a way to assess the current state of water privatization. Ghana also served to
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illustrate the potential for the citizens of a country to organize against an unpopular reform
project.
The three countries also provided examples of three different contract types. Guinea
utilized a lease contract. Senegal implemented an affermage contract (an alteration of a lease
contract). Finally, Ghana used a management contract. The use of different models allowed for
the opportunity to assess if one option is more effective than another type of contract.
The three case studies presented provide many lessons on the water privatization process.
With this information, it was possible to assess the future of the process, as well as evaluate
whether it can be utilized as a tool for addressing the global water crisis.
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Case One: Water Privatization in Guinea
Water Sector Prior to Privatization
Geographically, Guinea’s capital city of Conakry is situated in a location where all of the
community’s water needs should be easily satisfied. In addition to high levels of annual rainfall,
the nearby Grandes Chutes reservoir has the potential to supply 500,000 m³/day, which would be
more than enough to satisfy the needs of all of Conakry. This water source is an especially
attractive supply option because it is located 233 meters above sea level, which allows for the
system to be gravity fed and thus supplied at a lower cost.98
Prior to privatization, the water sector was weak with many management and structural
problems. The sector was run by the public agency Enterprise Nationale de Distribution de l'Eau
Guinéenne (DEG). Two of DEG's greatest issues were lack of documentation and consistent
procedures. In 1985, a consultant was brought in to assess the current state of the water sector.
The consultant’s report concluded that an audit could not be performed because there was limited
documentation about the agency's financial performance. The agency was only able to stay in
operation due to subsidies and revenue from government water usage.99
Along with financial issues, the sector was inefficient in its operations. The government
had a policy that guaranteed a job to all university graduates. This resulted in DEG being greatly
overstaffed with 504 employees (34 employees/1000 connections). In addition to excess
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employees, the financial troubles of the country meant that workers across government sectors
had low salaries that occasionally were not paid. This resulted in employees lacking the incentive
to work efficiently and resulted in poor service.100
The problems of debt and inefficient performance were compounded by low water rates,
lack of metering, and limited bill collection for water delivery. The water rate was GF 10/m³
($0.02/m³) until 1986 when it was increased to GF 60/m³ ($0.12/m³). This was significantly
lower than the estimated marginal cost, which was perceived to be between $0.25 and $0.82.101
Additionally, it was found that in 1984, only 5 percent of all connections were metered.102 The
combination of low water rates, and inaccurate billing and collecting, resulted in a financially
unstable sector. Another issue in the operation was the high number of illegal connections, and
aging infrastructure, which resulted in a high level of unaccounted for water (UFW). This is
water that escapes through leaks or illegal connections. The 1985 consultant’s report estimated
that UFW was at least 60 percent.103 This is significant because UFW cannot be billed, and thus
comes at a cost to the provider, but brings in no revenue.
The operational problems experienced by DEG resulted in poor service and quality of
water. At the time of privatization, there were 13,300 legal connections and 40 standpipes (free
standing pipe for public water access). Estimates put water coverage at 38 percent of the city
population. The coverage was likely higher as this figure does not include those receiving water
from illegal connections.104 Those without access to the water supply system were forced to rely
on well water for their consumption. In 1992, 29 percent of Conakry solely used well water, and
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50 percent used well water when piped service was interrupted. This is significant when coupled
with the fact that 80 percent of Conakry utilized unimproved sanitation facilities, which resulted
in polluted well water.105 This reliance on contaminated well water is important to note because
of the increased risk for health problems associated with its consumption.

Privatization Model
When the government decided to go through with privatization, many models were
considered before opting for a lease contract. Under this scheme, the public sector was
responsible for the infrastructure, and a company with a private majority was responsible for
operating the sector.106 While many privatization projects have a great deal of private sector
influence, it was less prevalent in Guinea because of government unrest and a weak judicial
system that had a history of difficulty with enforcing private contracts.107 These conditions led to
a situation where private sector participation was risky to the firms, and thus limited participation
was secured.
The privatization was officially implemented in 1989. Due to the World Bank supporting
the project, there were conditions that needed to be met with the setup of the privatization. First,
the World Bank required that the private operator be selected through international bidding.
Originally, there were six companies that submitted bids (SONEDE, TEAME, Lyonnaise des
Eaux, SAUR, SAGER, and Vivendi). After this initial process, two companies dropped out, and
the other four formed two consortia. The winning group was SAUR and Vivendi whose bid was
30 percent below the cost estimated by consultants.108
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In order to carry out the public-private partnership, two enterprises were formed. The first
was the public Société Nationale des Eaux de Guinée (SONEG). The second firm was the publicprivate Société d'Exploitation des Eaux de Guinée (SEEG). SONEG and SEEG worked together
under a 10 year lease contract. Under this type of contract, the private operator (SEEG) is
responsible for the day to day operations and receives all bill payment from consumers. The
operator then pays a lease fee to the public asset holder (SONEG), and keeps the rest of the
revenue as payment for its work.
SONEG was completely owned by the government, and reported to a board of directors,
and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy. There was a contract between SONEG and
the government. In this contract, there were conditions on water rates, a requirement that the
government pay all bills, and defined targets for the reform.109 Under the terms of the lease
contract with SEEG, SONEG owned all assets, was responsible for planning and implementing
new investments, paying off all sector debt, and setting water rates.110
SEEG was jointly owned by the government of Guinea (49 percent) and the consortia of
SAUR and Vivendi (51 percent). Under the lease contract, SEEG was responsible for the
operational aspects of the water sector, including distribution, collection, and small-scale
infrastructure. For their contribution, the government provided equipment and infrastructure.
SAUR and Vivendi provided 51 percent of the startup funds which totaled US $3 million.111 A
detailed breakdown of the contracts and responsibilities of each party can be found listed as
Chart Two in the Appendix.
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Financing Privatization
The World Bank had been active in Guinea’s water sector long before the privatization
process began. The first major project was the Conakry Water Supply and Sanitation Project
(WSP-1), which ran from April 1979 to December 1985, and provided US $21.874 million for
sector improvements. The goals of the project were, “aimed primarily at establishing Entreprise
Nationale de Distribution d'Eau de Guinee (DEG) as a viable organization, at restoring a
satisfactory water supply level of service and at providing appropriate sanitation to most of
Conakry's population.”112 While some of the structural issues were improved, the management
and institutional problems persisted. A lesson learned from the WSP-I, was that sector
improvements would only come with, “a radical reshaping of institutional responsibilities,
preferably through a degree of privatization.”113
With this lesson learned, the World Bank implemented the Second Water Supply Project
(WSP-II) in 1989. This occurred simultaneously to the privatization of the water sector. The
motivation for the WSP-II was that the goals of WSP-I were not fully achieved, and this would
be the second attempt at World Bank support for the sector. The World Bank cited that the WSPII, "was structured with the main goal of creating a legal, institutional, technical, and financial
framework that would constitute a sound basis for further sector development.”114 The project
provided US $105.6 million to fund new investment, as well as rehab existing infrastructure. 115
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This was a significant undertaking because it was the first World Bank project, “to
support private sector participation (PSP) in the delivery of urban water services.”116 Being the
first PSP project is important because it serves as a model for all future projects.

Changes After Privatization
After the water sector was reformed, there were improvements, although not as
significant as expected during the planning process. Looking at the numerous facets of water
delivery allows one to see where structural issues may have hindered improvements.
One of the greatest areas of advancement following reform was the increased investment
in the sector. The primary funding for investments came from the World Bank through the
previously discussed Second Water Supply Project. Had the sector continued to operate under
DEG, there would have been no outside donor support, and the upgrades to the sector would
have never happened. This project also resulted in the construction of a new treatment plant, and
made the pipeline from Grande Chutes a reality. The new pipeline increased the potential water
production from 54,000 m³/day in 1988 to 100,000 m³/day in 1993.117
While there was an increase in the number of connections in Conakry, the increase was
less than expected. Coverage improved from 38 percent to 47 percent. There are two main
factors cited as for why coverage improved so minimally. First, the cost to connect to the sector
was so high that many citizens could not afford the investment. Second, the contractual
relationship between SONEG and SEEG was constructed in such a way that many
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responsibilities seemed to overlap, and resulted in disagreements about who was responsible for
connections.118
An important factor in water sector development is the quality of the drinking water. This
is also an area where improvements are hard to assess, as there are no records of measuring the
water quality prior to reform. Even without statistical data, improvements after reform were
evident in that piped water passed the standards needed for use by the local Coca-Cola bottling
plant. Additionally, a 1994 study found that the chemicals and bacteria found within Conakry’s
drinking water met the standards of the World Health Organization (WHO).119
In order for the sector to be financially stable, there had to be a system of metering in
order to know how much water was being consumed. Prior to privatization, this was one of the
weakest areas of the sector with only five percent of consumers having a working meter. In 1996,
98 percent of private and 100 percent of government connections had working meters.120
Metering is ineffective if there is not a system in place to bill users and collect on water metered.
This area improved, but continued to struggle following reform. At the beginning of the
privatization process, private consumer collection was 75 percent, but fell to 50 percent in 19911992, before settling at 60 percent in 1996.121 Civil servants and deputies had previously had
unbilled private connections, but this practice was ended. Additionally, payment for water used
by the government had been sporadic. At the beginning of the privatization process, the
government paid their water bills regularly. In 1991, the government collection rate fell to 50
118
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percent, and then fell further to 10 percent in 1993. This low level of compliance was addressed
and by 1996 the government payment was 80 percent.122
An area that plagues many public utilities is inefficiency due to excess employees. As
stated previously, prior to reform DEG had 504 employees. After reform, SEEG employed 312
workers, and SONEG had 43 workers. These cuts made the sector more productive. The two
measures used to assess productivity are connections per worker and output per worker. After
reform, both improved but had different outcomes in the long run. Connections per worker
increased after reform, only to drop between 1994 and 1996 before increasing again. Output per
worker continuously increased after reform. It is believed that the differences can be attributed to
the fact that after reform revenue from water sales increased slowly whereas revenue from
construction increased rapidly.123
One of the main motives for privatization was DEG’s poor finances. After privatization,
there were strong financial improvements, which would be expected given the large increase in
metering, billing, and collection. SEEG became and remained profitable posting GF 3.2 billion
in profits in 1996.124 While SEEG was financially strong, SONEG had mixed results. One of the
areas of improvement was that, “SONEG’s total revenues grew significantly, going from GNF
624 million in 1990 to GNF 6,026 million in 1995.”125 While revenues increased, SONEG’s
profits were negative, which was, “due to the sharp drop in the ‘rental fee’ that SEEG paid
SONEG and the end of the subsidy that the government paid SONEG for debt service.”126 This
was not surprising as most of SONEG’s funding came from donors, rather than from within the
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sector, and because there was a great need for a large amount of spending due to needed
infrastructure. This will be more of an issue when donor funding is not available.127
The most controversial change was the increase in water prices. As discussed previously,
initial rates were too low to support the needs of the sector. At the same time, increasing prices to
a level of full cost recovery would be heavily felt by the people. The solution was to implement a
government subsidy that would slowly diminish over a six year period. At the time of reform,
prices increased from GF 60/m³ ($0.12/m³) to 150 FG/m³ (US $0.25/m³), which was enough to
cover SEEG and SONEG’s daily costs.128 In 1996, at the end of the government subsidy, prices
were expected to be 660 GNF/m³ but instead had increased to 880 GNF/m³.129130
Another important factor was that the cost to get connected to the system was 90,000 FG
(roughly US $90). This was very high even for wealthier citizens.131 As the intended goal of
privatization should be to improve water delivery and increase connections, the high cost of both
delivery and connection was alarming. If the wealthiest cannot make the investment in a piped
water connection then the urban poor have no chance of gaining access to the system.
Another issue was the setup of the relationship between SONEG and SEEG. Both
SONEG and SEEG were responsible for varying levels and types of investment, but differing
priorities have led to disputes. The main issue was that, “Because SONEG [tended] to be more
concerned with social and political goals, while SEEG [had] commercial goals, they often
[disagreed] on priorities concerning network expansion.”132 Examples of social and political
goals include focusing on how decisions impact the poor, and catering to a certain group of
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voters. Commercial goals are associated with the cost of providing a service and a company’s
bottom line. With these different motives, the two companies have had difficulty working
together. With more distinct roles, and a clearer breakdown in responsibility, there would have
been fewer disagreements and delays.
When disputes did occur, there was no clear protocol for filing complaints. The varying
responsibilities meant that one party could use its power to retaliate against the actions of the
other party. When a natural monopoly, such as water resources are privatized, most often a
regulator is in place to ensure that the firm doesn’t overextend its monopoly power.133 In Guinea,
there was no regulator and thus disputes could not be settled. One of the lessons of this
privatization was that there must be, “an independent body that can enforce the contract and
prevent the government from taking retaliatory action”134 The contract setup was supposed to
address this issue. With the government owning 49 percent of SEEG, it was believed that there
would be a common voice between SONEG and SEEG, but instead this just resulted in more
disagreements.135
Another issue was the continued high level of UFW. In 1996, UFW was 48 percent.
There are a few reasons for this high percentage. First, even after reform, there were a high
number of illegal connections to the system. Also, in places where infrastructure has not been
improved, there is a greater chance for broken pipes and leaks. While a high level of UFW
illustrates that the sector has room for improvement, little was done to address the problem. This
can be traced back to the contract between SONEG and SEEG. SEEG paid a rental fee for the
right to run the sector. This fee was negotiated based on revenue from collection not the amount
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of water delivered. There was little incentive to reduce the wasted water because it did not
impact the company financially.136 This goes back to the motives of the companies and
privatization schemes as a whole. A company motivated by finances will disregard issue of
social and environmental concern as long as their bottom line does not suffer.
Touched upon early was the issue of the government not paying its bills. The lack of
payment from the government was significant because it made up 30 percent of total sales. This
greatly impacted the ability of the private firm to fund their operations. This lack of payment
meant higher prices had to be passed on to the rest of the consumers to cover costs.137 While
SEEG had the contractual right to cut off anyone who does not pay their bills for three
consecutive months, they continued to supply the government with water. This is because SEEG
needed the government. The interrelated nature of SONEG and SEEG means that the
government had great control over the decisions made and thus has some level of power over
SEEG’s decision making.138

Water Sector Today
The overall results of the water privatization in Guinea were positive, but issues in the
format of the contract between SONEG and SEEG, as well as supply issues, hurt the overall
success of program. Additionally, while there were upgrades across the water sector, these
improvements came at an unacceptably high cost to the consumers.
What cannot be denied is that significant investment from the World Bank, and other
development organizations, greatly improved the infrastructure and subsequently the delivery of
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water services in the city. While the initial results were mostly positive, over time the
relationship between the government and private operator broke down. There was an attempt to
extend the contract, but disagreements over changes in the expectations for each party caused the
negotiations to fail. In 2001, SAUR and Vivendi sold their shares of SEEG and the sector
reverted to complete government control. The government merged SONEG and SEEG into the
Société des Eaux de Guinée (SEG).
After the privatization ended, the sector began to experience problems. Interrupted water
supply has become common and the sector is financially unstable and close to bankrupt. Finally,
as seen prior to privatization, the rapid urbanization in Conakry has caused the percentage of the
population with access to a piped connection to decrease from 31 percent in 1990 to 28 percent
in 2004.139 This case shows that privatization can have a great influence on water services but
that these improvements will not be sustainable if the cost to consumers greatly increases.
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Case Two: Water Privatization in Senegal
Water Sector Prior to Privatization
Unlike Guinea, the Republic of Senegal is much drier and does not have as abundant a
level of rainfall or lie on a plentiful aqueduct. The major sources of water are the Senegal and
Gambia Rivers, but the water levels have been dropping annually. While some regions do have
access to sufficient groundwater, over utilization has resulted in increased salinization, and an
inability to use the resource. Water wells are often used in urban areas, but the lack of adequate
sanitation means some wells have been contaminated, resulting in people drinking unsafe
water.140
With these issues, it was clear something needed to change in order to provide the urban
citizens of Senegal with clean and plentiful water. Privatization of water resources was not a new
concept in Senegal when reform occurred in 1995. When Senegal gained independence from
France in 1960, the country’s urban water was controlled by Générale des Eaux (Vivendi). This
private sector control continued until 1971 when the government nationalized the sector.141
During the 1970s and 1980s, the sector experienced numerous issues both in terms of
management and delivery. It was decided in 1983 to form a public utility, Société Nationale
d’Exploitation des Eaux du Sénégal (SONEES), which would be responsible for running the
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sector.142 Under a public utility, the government contracts out the service to a business that
provides everyday necessities, and is subject to government regulation. The need for government
regulation is that most public utilities hold monopoly power over the good they are providing.143
It was hoped that the creation of SONEES, guided by business principles, would help improve
water production and deliver in the country.
SONEES was responsible for service deliver to the capital city of Dakar, and 41 other
towns that all had populations over 5,000 people. This accounted for roughly 90 percent of the
total urban population of Senegal.144 Prior to privatization, less than 56 percent of the 2.4 million
people living in the Dakar metropolitan area had access to water from SONEES. Those with
water connections were not guaranteed access for a full 24 hours a day.145 In fact, due to a
shortage of 82,000 m³/day, water was only supplied for 16 hours a day on average. Pair this with
27 percent of water produced being lost through theft or leakage, and the sector was clearly in
need of reform.146
While contracting the service to a public utility did improve some aspects of the sector,
there were still numerous management issues that limited SONEES. The government’s decision
to heavily regulate SONEES’s activities meant that the company was limited in its ability to
provide the service to all those in need. This lack of sovereignty meant that SONEES couldn’t
set water rates, plan improvements, or push public agencies to pay their bills without input from
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the government.147 It was this need for independence, as well as water delivery problems, which
illustrated the need for reform.

Privatization Model
When it was decided that the sector would be privatized, a committee was created to
complete evaluations of past water privatization schemes, in order to assess the best option for
Senegal’s needs. The committee was made up of the offices of the President, Prime Minister, and
officials with some connection to water resources in the country.148 This is a key component of
Senegal’s privatization process because the officials were attempting to learn everything about
the process and potential pitfalls prior to their own implementation.
Guided by recommendations from the committee, SONEES was broken up. In its place, a
State Asset Holding Company, Société Nationale des Eaux du Sénégal (SONES), was created to
serve as the owner of the sector assets as well as to plan and implement all large investments.
Additionally, a private operating company, Sénégelaise des Eaux (SDE), was formed to run the
daily operations. SDE was owned by numerous parties including the majority owning French,
private company SAUR which won the international bidding process with a proposed supply rate
of 236 CFA per cubic meter. Ownership of SDE was broken up with SAUR owning 57.84
percent, Senegalese investors 32.16 percent, the State five percent, and former SONEES staff
five percent.149
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By creating a State Asset Holding Company, the government was able to show the people
that they were not simply handing over the sector to private ownership, but rather that they were
being active participants in the process. Additionally, the responsibilities of the State Asset
Holding Company, and the private company, were clearly defined which was deemed important
to ensure there were no arguments over duties once the project began.
Contracts were set to ensure that all interactions between the different parties went
smoothly. SONES signed a 30 year concession contract, and a sector development contract,
which outlined investment responsibilities. SDE signed a performance contract with SONES,
outlining each firm’s responsibilities, and provided incentives for demonstrated improvements.
Finally, the two firms and the Republic of Senegal all signed a 10 year affermage contract which
will be discussed below.150 A table illustrating the contracts and relationships between the
different groups can be found in the appendix labeled as Chart Three.
Under the chosen affermage contract the asset holder takes on all investment
responsibility and, “the private operator is responsible for collecting the water user fees from the
individual customers and will retain for itself an amount specified in the contract which generally
covers its operating costs and agreed upon profit”.151 Like in Guinea, the private operator is
responsible for managing the sector and is paid for this service. The difference between the lease
contract in Guinea, and the affermage contract in Senegal, is the level of risk taken on by the
private operator. Under a lease contract, the amount paid to the asset holder is set, and the private
operator holds the risk depending on how much revenue is produced. Under an affermage
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contract, the private operator is guaranteed the agreed upon fee, and it is the asset holder who
takes on the risk for the amount of revenue produced.152
In addition to the issue of risk, there are a few reasons as to why this type of contract
would be chosen. First, the asset holder has complete control of the rate structure which ensures
that citizens are not being overcharged solely for the benefit of the private operator. Also, an
affermage contract is especially appealing because limited outside regulation is needed in order
to sustain the project. Much of the needed regulation comes from the guidelines within the
contract.153 This is significant because it allows for each party to achieve its own expectations
without much interference. On the other hand, it could result in future issues regarding who to
address with complaints. Finally, an affermage contract does not require large scale investment
from a private operator. The government had no need for extra investment, as they had already
secured enough from donors and done so at a lower cost than would have been possible from the
private sector.154
Along with the affermage contract, there was also a performance contract. In addition to
the normal payment set up under the affermage contract, a formula was created to include
incentives for SDE. First, there was the measure of technical efficiency which was used to help
reduce UFW to 15 percent within five years. The second incentive was to improve bill collection
to 97 percent by year three.155 This was important because it gave the private operator incentive
to improve two of the greatest problems plaguing the sector. Without these incentives, SDE
would be paid their guaranteed fee regardless of whether or not there were improvements in the
water sector.
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One of the main goals of the project was to achieve long-term financial stability. This
was to be achieved through the use of an intricate financial model. The model was created by
Ernst and Young with help from the World Bank. With the model, the parties involved could test
out different scenarios and assess the viability of financial equilibrium being achieved. After
numerous attempts, a scenario was found that would achieve equilibrium in 2003 given that the,
“World Bank-financed investment project went ahead, network efficiency was improved, and
consumer tariffs for water supply were increased at a rate of no more than 3 percent per year.”156
Even with strong planning, and clearly defined contracts, the privatization would not
have been possible without the funds from the World Bank and other development agencies.
Below is an outline of the support provided for this project.

Financing Privatization
Without support from outside donors, reform would not have been possible. Originally,
the World Bank planned to provide funding to increase the amount of water that could be
delivered to Dakar from the Ngnith plant, but that was seen as pointless with UFW still being
high. With that in mind, the Bank provided funding through the World Bank Water Sector
Project for improvements to both the plant as well as the overall operations of the sector.157
The International Development Association (IDA), which is the branch of the World
Bank that assists developing countries with loans, was the major donor for this project. It
provided US $85 million to SONES of which 45 percent was a loan with the remaining 55
percent as equity. An additional US $15 million was provided to the Ministry of Hydraulics.158
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The other donors to the project were SONES, The French Fund for Development (CFD), the
state of Germany, the Action Group for Community Development (AGCD), the European
Investment Bank (EIB), the Nordic Development Fund (NDF), the West African Development
Bank (BOAD), and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA).159
The goals of the World Bank project were to improve sustainability, address poverty and
health issues, and to involve the private sector in the country’s urban water supply.160 This would
be achieved through using the provided funds to rehab existing infrastructure, expand the sector
to underserved urban areas, and improve the management of the sector. It was estimated that
improvements from this project would benefit 1.8 million people.161
In addition to support from the donor community, the project relied on other financial
opportunities to reach the level of funding needed. Using the previously discussed financial
model, it was found that there would be a cash shortfall of US $21 million in 1998 due to
planned construction. In order to overcome this issue, three different options were combined.
First, SDE had to purchase all operating equipment from SONES. Second, a portion of the
financing was structured as equity. This gave investors part-ownership within the sector and
meant that the government wouldn’t have to pay any debt on the funds as they would have to if
the funds were structured as a loan. Finally, SONES received a line of credit from Citibank and
Compagnie Bancaire de l’Afrique (CBAO). The ability to attract banks to contribute a line of
credit was not only seen as innovative, but it signified that the government, private operator, and
project as a whole were trusted and expected to be successful.162
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Changes After Privatization
With most water privatization projects, the increase in water rates is the most contentious
issue. In Senegal, the price of water prior to privatization covered all maintenance and operations
costs, but didn’t allow for the needed investment to expand the sector. Rather than raising rates
for all individuals equally, a system was enacted to form an increasing block tariff. Under this
setup, there is a “social tariff” for those consuming under 20 m³/60 days, a “dissuasive tariff” for
using more than 100m³/60 days, and then a normal tariff for consumption between these two
levels. The reason for this approach is that it will create a cross-subsidy where, “consumption in
the higher blocks will generate enough surplus to finance the subsidy delivered to customers
consuming water in the lowest ‘lifeline’ block...”163
Prior to privatization, there were two large price hikes: one in 1992 and another in 1994.
Since 1996, when privatization was implemented, the nominal rates have increased at an average
annual rate of 3.5 percent, but only 2.1 percent when viewed in real terms.164 These increases
were low in part because the water rates charged prior to privatization already covered the day to
day costs of the sector. Additionally, the low increase in water rates reflected the strong planning
prior to privatization, and the government's reliance on the financial model for justifying any
changes in the water rates. While it was important to keep consumer prices relatively close to the
rates charged prior to privatization, there is some concern about the future of the sector. If the
revenue brought in only covers operational and delivery costs, Senegal will continue to need to
rely on the donor community for funding for future investments.165 While the donor community
has been extremely helpful up to this point, the government and the water sector should not
become reliant on it because there is no guarantee it will always be provided.
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Even with only slight price increases, there must be improvements in numerous other
areas for the privatization to be deemed beneficial to the consumers. One area is the quantity of
water available to consumers. Due to the improvements from privatization, the water supply
increased by 18 percent from 264,000 m³/day to 312,000 m³/day between 1996 and 2003.166
During this period, 81,000 households were connected to the sector, and 400 standpipes were
constructed.167 The greatest reason for this increased availability was the construction of the
Ngnith plant, located on Lac de Guiers (Lake Guiers), and the 150 kilometer pipeline connecting
it to Dakar.168
Another area that is often a negative outcome of privatization is the impact on workers.
Often public utilities are overstaffed, and a private company comes in and cuts employees for the
sake of efficiency. A study found that employment by SDE and SONES did decline but that the
losses were, “not accomplished by lay-offs but by natural attrition”.169 Those who were still
employed found that payment increased after privatization, but at a much smaller rate than prior
to reform. Prior to reform, wages and benefits were increasing at 20.5 percent (15.3 percent in
real terms). After reform, wages and benefits increased by 4.8 percent (3.3 percent in real
terms).170 A reason for the relatively good outcome for employees was twofold. First, the
original public utility SONEES was not greatly overstaffed prior to privatization, which was rare.
Second, part of the planning stage included a clause that all former SONEES staff be retained in
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some capacity after reform took place.171 While the overall benefits to employees have been
positive, there still have been some issues that have yet to be resolved. Most notably, the
stipulation that all SONEES employees had to be retained in fact caused some frustration. Those
employees who did not receive jobs working for SDE, but instead gained employment with
SONES, are making less money but responsible for overseeing their co-workers. At times this
has resulted in difficulty working together, but overall, has not impacted the work of the
sector.172
A unique aspect of this privatization project was the targets given to the private operator.
The first target was to improve technical efficiency from 73 percent to 85 percent. This ended up
being extremely challenging because the initial 73 percent baseline was significantly
overestimated with the actual figure being much lower. SDE was not able to reach their goal and
still had not reached 80 percent by the 2002 target.173 The second target of bill collection has
been much more successful with SDE meeting, and sustaining, the 97 percent target since
1999.174 The private operator is compensated financially for meeting these objectives. It is paid
the bid price for the water delivered and then either rewarded with a higher price based on
achieved objectives or a reduced price for underperforming.175
With the implementation of privatization, there were financial improvements for both the
public and private sectors. In the public sector, from 1996 to 2000 SONES recorded losses, but
since 2000 those losses have been reduced. Additionally, the cash balance of the public utility
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has been positive since 1996.176 SDE also performed well. After initial issues in the first few
years of service, SDE has recorded profits since 1999.177
It is important to point out there was potentially a major problem with the project that
was averted through cooperation and negotiations. As previously stated, the technical efficiency
starting point was overestimated. This made achieving the target even more difficult, and hurt
SDE financially. This issue was resolved when in 1998 SONES and SDE came together and
were able to renegotiate the targets. This in effect reduced the base year figure and subsequent
targets. For payment, SDE is paid their base figure and then the either earn or are fined based on
whether or not it meets the targets. Due to incorrect targets, SDE was wrongfully fined and this
hurt their financial performance. When the targets were re-negotiated, SDE went from recording
losses to continued profit. 178
The fact that the two parties could come to these recalculations and settle all monetary
issues without hostility or the need of outside regulators is extremely important for future
projects. All too often, when times get tough parties that should be working towards the same
goal fracture and divide. This project shows that is possible for a company to put its personal
interests aside, and work towards the greater goal of the project. This is possible while still
making good business decisions.

Addressing the Needs of the Poor
A major concern of people opposed to private sector participation is that it
disproportionately hurts the poor. The poor often cannot afford the increase in price, both in
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terms of delivery and connection costs. The privatization scheme in Senegal made a direct effort
to address the needs of the poorest citizens.
The government has come up with three ways to address the water needs of the poor.
First, as discussed in the section of water tariffs, they have created a “social tariff” which
delivers water at a reduced cost to those consuming small amounts of water. The second policy
subsidizes the cost of connecting to the water system through a “social connection program”.
Finally, the government has built standpipes in areas of higher poverty that supply water at a
lower rate (although not as low as if they had access to their own pipe).179 The government has
shown an understanding of the special challenges the poor face, and the need to create policies
that take into account their financial situation. A major factor in the success of these initiatives
was the contract format that pays SDE their fee based on water distributed. This means there was
no disincentive to provide water to the poor.180
The criticism of these policies focuses on the social connection program. The policy in
fact ensures that the poorest, and greatest in need, cannot gain access to this program. To be
eligible for a reduced rate connection someone must, “have title to the land, and an existing
house must be located on it.”181 The poorest of the poor do may not be able to meet these needs
and thus are ineligible. A reduction in the requirements would allow for the policy to reach more
people and especially those who could benefit the most from the program.

Water Sector Today
The World Bank Water Sector Project was scheduled to close on June 30, 2001 but was
extended twice, and eventually ended on June 30, 2004. The major reason for this delay was that
179

Ibid., p. 37
Dakar, Senegal, p. 11
181
Brocklehurst and Janssens, p. 42
180

65

the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Senegalese CFA changed between the planning
and implementation phases, which resulted in savings that could be utilized.182 While the World
Bank funding came to an end, the privatization has continued and has been one of the most
successful projects of its kind. The format of this scheme has been carried out in other countries
and has served as a model for the best way to carry out the implementation of private sector
involvement in a country's water sector. The results have continued as 76 percent of urban
households now have access to water which is the highest level in all of SSA.183 If there is a
return to an emphasis on water privatization for addressing global water issues, Senegal serves as
a strong model for duplication.
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Case Three: Water Privatization in Ghana

Water Sector Prior to Privatization
Ghana was the first country in SSA to gain independence in 1957. After independence,
the Ministry of Works and Housing (MWH) created a Water Supply Division in order to provide
water to both the rural and urban populations across the country. This existed until 1965 when
the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) was created in order to meet the water and
sanitation needs of the country.184 The hope was that by creating a business to run the water
supply sector, operations would become more efficient and service would improve. In reality,
GWSC had a difficult time delivering the service, and there were many issues with the sector.
From 1970 to 1990, “one-third of the facilities had broken down and the rest operated below
design capacity.”185 Additionally, between 1992 and 2002, urban water coverage dropped from
76 percent to 59 percent while UFW stood at 50 percent.186 These negative results signaled the
need for sector reform.
GWSC continued to be the sole provider of water until 1994 when rural and urban water
supply was separated as suggested by the World Bank. In its place, two new companies were
created. The Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) was responsible for rural water
supply, and Ghana Water Company Ltd (GWCL) was created to meet urban water needs.187 The
World Bank knew that there was a great economic incentive to have the urban water supply
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separated from the rural sector.188 By separating the two, the potentially profitable urban sector
would be independent of the unprofitable rural sector. It was after this decision was made that
the push to privatize the urban water supply began. In February of 1995, a group of consultants
were brought in to plan out the best option for the sector. It was determined that a lease contract
would be the best avenue for reform.189 Under this contract type, the private operator would have
been responsible for, “providing the water supply, rehabilitating and renewing pipes, maintaining
assets, billing and collecting tariffs, and expanding service coverage.”190
In 1997, the Government of Ghana created the Public Utility Regulatory Commission
(PURC), “to ensure appropriate regulation in the water and electricity sectors.”191 While
regulation is vital, especially when dealing with a natural monopoly such as water, the
commission’s autonomy was weak as there was great pressure from the World Bank and IMF.
The IMF pushed for PURC to prepare the sector to operate at a level of full cost recovery. This
was done through the creation of an “automatic tariff adjustment mechanism” which would
automatically change water rates based on shifts in Ghana’s currency. Due to the fact that
Ghana’s currency depreciated far more than it appreciated, this meant prices were expected to
continuously increase.192
After the consultant’s proposals were presented in 1995, it took until 1998 to complete
the project outline, and prepare for bids to be called. It was during this time that opposition from
within the country began to grow. In 1999, the Ministry of Housing and Works moved forward
with plans to work with the private United States company, Azurix, as the private operator. The
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two losing water giants, Suez and Vivendi, believed the process to pick the operator had been
corrupt and the project was eventually cancelled after legitimate concern over Azurix having
provided US $5 million in bribes to Ghanaian politicians.193
With another failed attempt at privatization, the public opposition to the proposal grew
more vocal. While individually many people had been upset since the initial privatization
attempts, it was not until 2001 when groups from across Ghanaian society came together and
formed the Ghana National Coalition Against the Privatization of Water (National CAP of
Water). The group’s goal was to, “defend water as a public good and a human right, to build
public awareness of the water privatization proposal, and to mobilize a broad cross-section of
society to oppose the privatization of water.”194
The group was greatly successful in bringing both national and international attention to
the privatization proposal in Ghana. There were a few reasons as to why they found success.
First, due to rapid urbanization, the percentage of the urban population with access to an
adequate water source has decreased over the past twenty years. While one would expect these
declines to lead to increased spending in order to address the deficiency, the opposite was in fact
true. Debt owed to the IMF and World Bank meant that the government had to decrease their
spending and thus the lack of urban water access only increased.195 The country’s poor financial
performance led to sector investments dropping as low as US $1.50 per capita per year.196
Another reason the group was successful was that even though access was decreasing, the

193

Ibid., p. 278
Ibid., p. 280-81
195
Ibid., p. 283
196
Project Information Document. Rep. no. AB423. The World Bank, 23 Sept. 2004. 1. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.
<http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/04/26/000104615_20040427151313/Rend
ered/PDF/Urban0Water0PID010April021102004.pdf>.
194

69

prospect of privatization led to increased prices. As part of the country's loan conditions, the
government was required to increase the water rates by 95 percent in order to move towards full
cost recovery.197 Decreased access, coupled with unaffordable prices, led to an overall distrust of
the World Bank/IMF and anger over the decision to move forward with water privatization.
The National CAP of Water's ability to bring together people from across society, as well
as experts from around the world, resulted in a brief victory. In 2003, the government announced
that they would be suspending the privatization as the public opposition, as well as changes in
the terms of the project, made the project undesirable.198 While the victory was short lived, and
privatization eventually moved forward, this story of public opposition illustrates an important
lesson for future projects. Strong public opposition makes governments wary of implementing
projects due to the potential political fallout as well as negative international attention.
Governments and the World Bank would be well advised to consult public groups about their
needs prior to embarking on a large scale project.
After this brief cancellation, the next attempt at privatization was in 2004 and success
was vital. At the time, the population of Ghana stood at 20 million people, and it was estimated
that 10.3 million, or 51 percent, had access to an improved water source. Additionally, of the 8.4
million citizens who live in urban areas, only 61 percent had access to improved water. 199 An
improved water source is defined as being, “protected from outside contamination, in particular
from contamination with faecal matter.”200 A level of 61 percent coverage is low but especially
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worrisome because urban water coverage stood at 70 percent in 2001 and even higher at 76
percent in 1992.201 The growing population without access to an adequate water source was
negatively impacted in numerous ways. Most notably, UNICEF found that in 2003, 70 percent of
all disease in Ghana was related to lack of adequate water and sanitation.202 As time went on, the
water sector was getting worse, and there seemed to be no other viable solution than to finally
privatize the sector.

Privatization Model
It was during the 2004 attempt at privatization that headway was finally achieved. While
previous attempts had suggested a lease contract, it was eventually decided on a five year
management contract to cover 80 urban areas. The lease contract option was deemed undesirable
by private operators because of the high level of investment that they would be responsible to
supply.203 The greatest change with the move from a lease to a management contract was that
outside investment went from the original proposal of US $140 million fell to zero with all
investment coming from the public asset holder through the World Bank.204
Under the management contract, the private operator was responsible for operating the
sector and achieving goals laid out in the contract but was not required to provide financial
investments.205 In return for successful operation, the operator would be paid by the World Bank
for the first four years. During the final year, payment would come 75 percent from the World
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Bank and 25 percent from funds derived from the improved sector.206 With all capital coming
from the World Bank, rather than the private sector, the contract allowed for the private company
to make money with limited risk. As long as it met the specified goals, the operator would be
meeting its end of the contract.
When it was decided to go ahead with a management contract, a private company had to
be selected to run the sector. The operator selected was a consortium of Vitens Evides
International and Rand Water. Vitens Evides International is composed of the two largest water
companies (Vitens and Evides) in the Netherlands and has a stated mission of supplying the,
“increasing number of people in developing countries with sustainable access to safe and reliable
drinking water services.”207 This is important to note because they are the only water company
involved in any of the three case studies that has a social mission that sees their goal as helping
the people of the developing countries who need water services. The other private operators all
understood they were helping expand a country's water services, but treated their jobs as business
first. Rand Water is a South African company that is the largest bulk water provider in Africa.208
It is the only African company that was utilized in the countries presented in the three case
studies. The two companies came together and formed Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (AVRL).

Financing Privatization
The renewed attempt to privatize Ghana’s urban water supply would not have been
possible had it not been for the support of the World Bank. While privatization had failed in past
attempts, the growing needs of the sector, and the lack of investment interest from the private
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sector, made it a good time for the World Bank to offer a large investment opportunity. The 2004
Urban Water Project proposal outlined two goals. The first goal was to improve access to water
in urban areas. There was a special emphasis on improving the access, affordability, and
reliability to clean water to the poor. The second goal was to improve the GWCL in terms of
their finances and capacity.209 In order to achieve these goals, the World Bank offered a credit of
US $103 million with additional support from other development agencies. The money was
allocated for network expansion, improvements to existing infrastructure, development of a
public-private partnership, improved capacity building and management, and policy reform
which most notably involved cost cutting within GWCL.210
The fact that the financing for improvements came completely from the World Bank
illustrated the shift in thinking that resulted from failed privatizations of the 1990s. While the
initial attempts to privatize the urban water supply in Ghana had proposed a lease agreement in
which investment would come from the private sector, the decision was made to switch to a
management contract because the private sector no longer believed that they could successfully
complete project objectives in a profitable manner.211 Having the private sector involved through
management of the sector shows that their knowledge and ability to improve efficiency are still
valued, but their access to financial capital is no longer necessary or available. If this trend
continues, it will force countries to rely even more heavily on the World Bank for financial
assistance, and force countries to accept the conditions that come with its support.

209

Project Appraisal Document on the Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 71 Million to the Republic of Ghana
for an Urban Water Project, p. 3
210
Project Information Document, p. 3
211
Project Appraisal Document on the Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 71 Million to the Republic of Ghana
for an Urban Water Project, p. 7

73

Changes After Privatization
The five year management contract was signed on November 22, 2005 and made official
on June 6, 2006. Assessing many key areas of the sector has been difficult due to lack of
recorded data prior to the project implementation. One of the positive outcomes of private sector
participation is that there is now accurate data for the present situation that can act as a baseline
for future projects.212 While some of the original data is not available, there were some key areas
of reform were still able to be assessed.
The area that needed the greatest improvement was unaccounted for water (UFW). In
2006, at the start of the privatization, UFW was estimated to be 53%. The contract laid out a goal
of reducing UFW by 5% every year. This was not met, and as of 2010, UFW stood at just under
50%. The operator claims that delays in meter installation and the rehabilitation of existing
infrastructure impacted the outcomes.213 This inability to reduce UFW is significant because it
reduces available water and hurts the sector financially which are both important aspects of
successful management.
While this was the greatest negative outcome of the privatization, there were some
improvements as well. One of the major goals of the project was providing water to the poor at
affordable costs. While prices did increase as discussed above, an innovative initiative was
created to help the urban poor in Ghana. The water company Vitens created “Water For Life” as
a separate foundation that allowed their customers to donate to help extend water services to the
urban poor. Thus far, over 75,000 people have benefited from this fundraising initiative.214
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Additional improvements included an increase in water production, an increase in the
number of connections from 364,000 to 438,000, and an increase in revenue from GHC 57
million GHC 143 million.215

Water Sector Today
In 2011, at the end of the five year contract, the government of Ghana did not renew the
management contract with AVRL. The Minister of Water Resources, Works and Housing, Alban
Bagbin stated that, "’From the evidence on the ground, and also, from the players on the field,
Aqua Vitens could not achieve most of the targets that were set for it.’”216 With the failed
negotiations, the water sector reverted back to being government owned and operated. While the
World Bank continues to push for a return to private sector participation, it remains to be seen
what will occur.217 While the project did bring some improvements and a great deal of
investment to the sector, overall it was a failure. Unlike the previous two case studies, the
situation in Ghana is valuable to evaluate because it gives a glimpse into the current state of
privatization. Future projects will have to rely on the private sector for knowledge rather than
capital. Additionally, meeting the needs and desires of the public citizens will be increasingly
important in an age where the ability to mobilize is easier than ever. Moving forward, the
government of Ghana has a great deal to do to deliver water to those in need in an affordable and
sustainable manner.
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Chapter 5: Findings
After completing the case studies of Guinea, Senegal, and Ghana, there are some clear
lessons that emerged regarding the viability of privatization as a solution to the global water
crisis. While each country has a unique history, population, and set of circumstances, there are
some characteristics that have emerged that if present will either improve or hurt the chances of
privatization being successful. The final chapter of this paper will discuss these different
characteristics, return to the debates on privatization, and give a final view on whether
privatization should continue to be utilized by the World Bank and other development
organizations as path to improving water access on a global level.

Conditions for Privatization

Planning
One of the key findings of the case studies was the need to plan out the process prior to
the implementation of privatization. Senegal represents the model for this condition. As
discussed in the previous chapter, Senegal created a committee that evaluated the needs of the
sector as well as past water privatization projects in other countries. The agreed upon layout
clearly defined each party’s responsibilities which led to smoother operations later. Additionally,
by taking the time to create the financial model, the government and the private operator could
test different scenarios and understand how the sector would operate. In hindsight, this model
was accurate and helped eliminate conflict.
While Senegal models the need for proper planning prior to implementation, there are
still valuable lessons to be learned from the less successful privatizations in Guinea and Ghana.
While in Guinea there was time spent looking at different model options, the greatest issue was
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an unclear breakdown of responsibilities. Without clearly defined roles, the asset holder and the
private operator had numerous disagreements over their roles. These disagreements hindered the
ability of each to do their job and slowed progress. Had the two parties taken the time to clearly
define each entities role, and ensured no overlapping responsibilities, the project would have
been more successful and achieved better results.
In Ghana, the project went through an extended planning phase but the government,
World Bank, and private operators were never fully on the same page when it came to goals and
commitment. Numerous delays in the negotiations, and the continued cancellation and restart of
the project, resulted in a poor start. Ghana illustrates that in order for a privatization project to be
successful, the planning stages must also be successful. If the project starts disjointed, the
disagreements it will be hard to move forward with everyone working towards one common
goal.
Moving forward, it is important that the World Bank, national government, and private
operator all take the needed time to plan the process prior to implementation. Too rash of a
decision to implement private sector support to any degree will hurt the project’s chance of
success. By taking the time to plan the timeline, responsibilities, and financing the project is
more likely to be successful and sustainable.

Contract Type
The countries represented in the three case studies utilized three different contracts: lease,
affermage, and management. One contract was not found to be better than another, but rather, a
country’s needs determined the choice. It is important to note that the current state of
privatization will impact the contract options for future projects. Ghana illustrated that due to
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past privatization failures, private companies are hesitant to contribute investment funds due to
the financial risk associated with privatization. This current state means that concession, lease,
and affermage contracts may be less favorable to management contracts.

Regulation
While parties can attempt to plan out every scenario ahead of time, issues may still arise.
It is in these instances that a regulator system must be in place in order to resolve disputes. This
was an issue in Guinea where there was no independent regulatory body in place. In Senegal, the
most successful case, there was also not a regulator body but it was argued that a regulatory
system was built into the affermage contract. While this worked well in Senegal, contracts may
not be enough regulation for every project, and having an independent regulator in place would
ensure at the very least a backup for dispute resolution. While a contract may help to create
defined roles and help solve any potential issues, it is best there be a body independent of the
government and the private participant(s) that can hear disputes. Finally, it is important that the
regulator be completely autonomous in its role. In Ghana, there was an attempted to create a
regulatory body with the creation of the Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC).
Unfortunately, the World Bank and IMF had a good deal of influence on their operations and
thus it cannot be seen as a strong regulatory body. If privatization is to reemerge as a focal point
of water development policy, it should be stressed that all projects have some form of
independent regulator in place. Regulation is vital and can greatly impact the success of a
privatization project.
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World Bank Project Selection
It is important that the World Bank support privatization projects that will advance the
sector rather than only supporting projects that are in seriously poor shape. In some ways, all
three of the case studies completed were of countries where the water sector was inefficient and
financially unstable. The difference was that the planning done prior helped to set up Senegal to
be more successful to privatization. The project was not rushed but rather built up in a way that
took into account the financial stability, the public’s opinions, goals of each party, and needs of
the sector. The World Bank and any other participating development agencies must fully
understand, and in some cases improve, a country’s water sector so that privatization is seen as a
way to advance the operations rather than save it from ruin.

World Bank Financial Support
The World Bank gets a good deal of criticism for pushing countries into privatization. In
many of these cases, the targeted country is in dire need of debt forgiveness, or financial support,
and cannot challenge the World Bank’s conditions. In this respect, the criticisms are just. That
being said, it is important to note that without the World Bank, none of these privatization
projects would have been possible. The significant investment supplied by the World Bank
helped to improve existing infrastructure, build new infrastructure, construct treatment plants,
and provide administrative training and support. Even for the projects that eventually failed, the
country and the people benefited from these improvements.
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Full Cost Recovery
One of the major controversies with privatization is whether pricing water to achieve full
cost recovery is necessary for a successful sector. In simple economic terms, full cost recovery is
extremely important. To run an operation at any level below where collected revenue is able to
meet the day to day needs, as well as hold money in reserve, will eventually lead to a break
down. From looking at the three case studies, it is clear that full cost recovery is important, but
that it can be achieved in different ways. All three sectors were financially unstable prior to
privatization. They were selling water at too low a price to cover daily costs, rehab needs, pay off
accumulated debt, and fund future investments. The trouble arose when it became clear that
operating at full cost recovery would result in the poorest citizens not being able to afford their
water. This was especially evident in Guinea where the end of the government subsidy resulted
in exorbitant prices that left many unable to afford their water. There is no question that water
operations must be conducted at a level of full cost recovery. In simple business ideology, a
business must make enough money to cover its costs. To operate below full cost recovery means
the sector will not be able to cover costs. This will result in the sector deteriorating or requiring
outside financial support that may not always be available. While operating at full cost recovery
is vital, there must also be an accompanying social dimension to projects that ensures the poorest
citizens can still afford this vital resource.

Social Dimension
Full cost recovery is necessary, but it should not result in citizens being unable to afford
to meet their basic water needs. All water privatization models should take into account the
needs of the poor, and create a social dimension to how the sector is run. Again, Senegal
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represents the example when it comes to considering the needs of the poor. Senegal implemented
a scaled tariff where different levels of consumption were charged different amounts. This
created a cross-subsidy where those consuming more were charged more and helped to pay for
the lesser charge applied to those using a minimal amount of water. Additionally, while
somewhat controversial due to the requirements needed to qualify, the social connection program
has allowed for an increase in the number of poor people connected to the water system. This is
significant because the cost to connect to the sector can often be too high negating the issue of
the subsequent cost of water. The privatization in Ghana also implemented a social program
through the private sector’s creation of the separate “Water For Life”. This venture helped fund
the connection cost for the poor but did not help with the cost of water. Full cost recovery is vital
because it ensures that the cost of delivering the services, as well as any future improvement
cost, are available. A social program is important to ensure that full cost recovery can be
successful while ensuring the poorest citizens of the community can still meet their basic needs.

Public Support
An important consideration for future projects is whether or not to include the public into
the decision making process that comes with undergoing a privatization process. While none of
the three cases sought public inclusion, the privatization in Ghana was greatly influence by
public opposition. The ability of the people of Ghana to come together, and speak out against the
privatization, helped to delay and bring international attention to the project. In the current state
of the world, where internet coverage is expanding, and social media allow for an increased
ability to connect, citizens will have an easier time coming together to speak out against
privatization. Governments, and private operators, would be smart to include citizens in the
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decision making process as a way to gain their support. While the different groups may not see
eye to eye on all aspects of the project, understanding, and acknowledging the public sector’s
needs and concerns would help gain support for the project.

Understanding the Individual Needs of the Sector
The conditions presented above do not guarantee the transformation of a failing water
sector to a level of prosperity. Instead, it lays out a few recommendations that were cultivated
from the three case studies conducted. It is believed that meeting the above conditions would
help improve any future water privatization projects chances for success. Every project, and
country, has a unique set of circumstances and should be viewed based on the individual needs.
In addition to these conditions, the case studies gave a clearer understanding of some of the
debates on private participation in the water sector.

The Debates Over Privatization
Chapter Two ended with the discussion of a few of the debates over the utilization of
water privatization. Having conducted the case studies, it is easier to come down on one side or
the in terms of the debates.

Efficiency or Profit
The first debate was about whether private sector participation was more efficient or only
resulted in the introduction of profit hungry companies. After looking at the case studies we see
evidence for both sides of the debate. In Guinea, the sector was more efficient and better run
after privatization. This is especially evident when they returned to government control and the
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sector reverted to many of its poorly managed ways. We also saw that while better managed,
water became so highly priced that people could not afford their water. Senegal shows that the
possibility of an efficiently run sector without an over-emphasis on profits. Prices were not
increased drastically but the sector was better run. Finally, Ghana gives no evidence to this
claim, as the privatization did not bring increased efficiency. It is clear from the Senegal case
that is possible to have privatization be more efficient without costs rising excessively in order to
satisfy the private operators profit needs. Much depends on working relationship and contract
between the private operator and the government. This point on the necessity of a good working
relationship goes back to the discussion on thoroughly planning the project prior implementation
to ensure all parties are on the same page.

Economic Good or Human Right
The fact that water has a cost associated with deliver automatically requires that it be
looked at as an economic good. That being said, the fact that water is vital for human life means
that it must also be seen as need. Water should be a human right because it is needed to sustain
life. However, human rights are upheld by both national and international law. If water is to be
seen as a human right, it must be at the most basic level because most countries do not have the
capacity or capital to provide every citizen with this resource. As long as countries are working
towards achieving universal coverage, it should not be seen as infringing on citizen’s human
rights.
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Water Pricing
Water pricing is one of the more controversial aspects of privatization because of how
great an impact it has on a country’s citizens. As discussed previously, the best option is to
ensure that a water sector is operating at a level of full cost recovery but accompanied by social
programs that ensure that the poorest can still afford water. A level of full cost recovery ensures
that the sector is financially stable. This is especially important when the World Bank financing
support comes to an end. As long as a social dimension is also included in the final price of
water, full cost recovery should not be a major issue.

Impact on Employment
The final debate was about the impact of privatization on employees. Those opposed to
privatization argue that the process results in increased unemployment while proponents argue
that overtime the unemployed find new jobs due to increased expansion of the sector. The case
studies show that most likely there will be an increase in unemployment. The severity of the
increase is dependent on the state of the sector prior to reform. Senegal had a limited increase in
unemployment because the water sector was already operating at an efficient level. This is rare
and for most public sectors in developing countries they are operating an inefficient level and
will see an increase in unemployment. These cuts most often lead to increased efficiency. Guinea
cut 149 workers and both connections per worker and output per worker improved. While the
increase in unemployment hurts those involved, it makes the sector more financially stable and
more efficient in terms of operation. Implementing a program to help train terminated employees
for other careers could help lessen the social burden of such needed cuts.
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Conclusion
The overarching question guiding this thesis was: is water privatization a bad model that
perpetuates poverty, or a model that if altered, could serve as the panacea for the global water
crisis? As with many questions it is not a simple answer.
Chapter One outlined the gravity of the problem. With lack of accessible water impacting
so many people, the need for a large, concentrated effort to bring improvements is vital. Chapter
Two looked at the history of privatization to assess why the process was believed to be the
solution to developing countries failing water sectors. Chapter Three looked at the major players
in the privatization process in order to assess participant’s motives. Chapter Four conducted three
case studies of Guinea, Senegal, and Ghana in order to learn from their privatization processes.
Finally, Chapter Five took the information learned from Chapter Four and suggested conditions
that needed to be satisfied in order to set up a successful privatization.
The five chapters resulted in a belief that privatization will not single handedly solve the
global water crisis but could have a big impact especially in urban areas. For urban citizens,
lacking efficient and reliable access to water, privatization can bring the needed investment and
infrastructure to improve the sector enough to meet their needs. Water privatization is only
viable in urban areas where the expected economic return is high enough to attract private sector
support. Rural areas have the greatest need for improved access to water and thus privatization
cannot be seen as the solution to the water crisis. Rather than looking at privatization as an all
encompassing solution, it should be viewed as a tool that can help improve the urban water
sector, and that will be most successful given that the previous mentioned conditions are met.
Moving forward, past failures will limit the amount of capital available from the hesitant
private sector. It will take increased support from the World Bank, and other development
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agencies, to provide the financial investment and attract private sector participation. From there,
parties must be willing to build the sector up to successful accept the privatization and then work
together to reach specific common goals. The poor history of privatization projects means the
process should be viewed with hesitation, but also with the understanding that under the right
circumstances, the process can greatly help a sector and the urban citizens of a country that is in
need.
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Appendix
Chart One

Hukka, J.J., and T.S. Katko. Water Privatisation Revisited. Publication. IRC International Water and Sanitation
Centre, 2003. 91. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd51/op_priv.pdf>.

Chart One shows the total investment in water and sewage projects between 1991 and
2001. As is stated in the text, water privatization peeked in 1997 and then fell. Referenced on
page 21
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Chart Two

Ménard, Claude, and George Clarke. A Transitory Regime Water Supply in Conakry, Guinea. Publication. The World Bank, Nov.
1999. 20. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.

Chart Two shows the relationship between SONEG, SEEG, the Government, and the private
company for the Guinea water privatization. The most important contract is the lease contract
between SONEG and SEEG. It is also important to note that the private consortium owns
51percent of SEEG with the government owning the minority 49 percent. Referenced on page
45.
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Chart Three

Brocklehurst, Clarissa, and Jan G. Janssens. Innovative Contracts, Sound Relationships: Urban Water Sector Reform in Senegal.
Publication no. 30947. The World Bank, Jan. 2004. 14. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/12/16/000090341_20041216144628/Rendered/PDF/309
470WSS0no1011Senegal01public1.pdf>.

Chart Three shows the relationships and contracts present in the Senegal water privatization.
SONES is the State Asset Holding Company and the French water company SAUR owns
majority stake in SEEG. SONES and SEEG work under a performance contract. SONES and the
government signed a 30 year concession contract which granted them the right to run the sector.
Finally, all three signed a ten year affermage contract. Referenced on page 56
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